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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses a legal issue that is arising with
increasing frequency; whether a political campaign’s use of a
song—without the permission of its performer—infringes on any
trademark rights of the performer.
To contextualize the issue, this Article begins by recounting a
number of high-profile complaints by singers about political
campaigns playing their songs. Next, it outlines the relevant
provisions of the Lanham Act and case law pertaining to nontraditional trademarks, and considers whether music can function
as a singer trademark. In doing so, it constructs and scrutinizes the
viability of a theory of “song-mark” protection as well as the way
that it would intersect with and contradict provisions of the
Copyright Act. Then, assuming arguendo that a singer is entitled
to such protection, this article analyzes whether campaign uses of
music meet the requirements of “false endorsement” so as to
constitute trademark infringement.
Ultimately, this Article
concludes that while, in theory, a song-based trademark could
exist, in practice it would either fail to acquire the appropriate
secondary meaning or be precluded—if not preempted—by
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Copyright law. Moreover, even if these substantive and procedural
hurdles were cleared, it is doubtful that a political campaign’s
playing of a song would confuse or mislead consumers under the
Lanham Act.
I. MUSIC AND POLITICS
Today, popular music is a standard component of any political
campaign. 1 It is used to energize crowds, 2 articulate campaign
messages, 3 and attract young voters. 4 Although it was not the first
to integrate music into a campaign, 5 the contemporary practice
can be traced to Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential campaign. 6
1

See Matthew J. Cursio, Born To Be Used In The USA: An Alternative Avenue For
Evaluating Politicians’ Unauthorized Use of Original Musical Performances on the
Campaign Trail, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 317 (2011); Eriq Gardner, Michele
Bachmann in Legal Spat for Using Tom Petty’s ‘American Girl’ at Rally, HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER, (June 28, 2011, 11:48 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/michele-bachmann-legal-spat-using-206257; Chris Richards, Campaigns Adopting
Songs Is Nothing New, But Squabbles With Musicians Are, WASH. POST (June 29, 2011),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-06-29/lifestyle/35265463_1_theme-songscampaign-season-appearances.
2
See James C. McKinley, G.O.P. Candidates Are Told, Don’t Use the Verses, It’s Not
Your Song, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2012, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/04/arts/music/romney-and-gingrich-pull-songs-aftercomplaints.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
3
See Cursio, supra note 1, at 317; McKinley, supra note 2 (explaining that candidates
use music for two purposes: to motivate supporters and to underline a campaign
message); see also Gardner, supra note 1 (discussing use of music in advertisements).
4
See Gardner, supra note 1, (Bachmann wanted to use a certain song to “score
points” with audience); Kenneth Kidd, Politicians and Rock Music: A Legal Wango
Tango, TORONTO STAR, July 2, 2011, http://www.thestar.com/news/insight/2011/07/02/
politicians_and_rock_music_a_legal_wango_tango.html (rock music is often used by
candidates to cater to young voters).
5
See Richards, supra note 1 (Politicians have used music since the late 1800s, but the
practice became popular only recently.); see also Guy Dixon, Do Not Use My Song Ever
Again, Globe Review, Music and Politics, GLOBE AND MAIL (Canada) (Feb. 2, 2012),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/arts/music/knaan-to-mitt-romney-dont-use-mymusic/article542793 (Franklin Roosevelt’s campaign adopted “Happy Days Are Here
Again” and John F. Kennedy’s campaign used Frank Sinatra’s “High Hopes”
accompanied by Sinatra’s endorsement.)
6
See Stephen Battaglio, The Biz: Arsenio Hall Talks Back, TV GUIDE (June 27, 2012,
7:01 AM), http://www.tvguide.com/news/arsenio-hall-talks-1049221.aspx (describing
how Clinton’s guest appearance changed the rules of campaigning); Hardball with Chris
Matthews (MSNBC television broadcast June 26, 2012) (describing Clinton’s iconic
campaign moments and “masterful” campaigning).
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Clinton adopted Fleetwood Mac’s “Don’t Stop (Thinkin’ About
Tomorrow),” playing it every day, at every event. 7 Not only did
the hit song inject vitality into rallies and elevate the mood of
crowds, 8 it also established a cultural touchstone for BabyBoomers 9 and encapsulated Clinton’s vision of optimism for the
future. 10 Since then, campaign theme songs have become de
rigueur. 11
A. Hitting the Wrong Note
As the use of music has increased, however, so have
complaints by artists who do not want their songs politicized or
associated with candidates they do not support. 12 A majority of
complaints have been by performers who favor Democrats and are
upset about Republicans using their songs; 13 some have even
objected to the use of their songs on television networks that have
a specific political bent. 14 While some artists object only when
7

See Cursio, supra note 1, at 317; Dixon, supra note 5; Anne Hull, A Petty Girl?
Bachmann, You Don’t Know How It Feels, WASH. POST (July 2, 2011),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-07-01/lifestyle/35266860_1_tom-pettyamerican-girl-michele-bachmann (Fleetwood Mac endorsed Clinton’s use and performed
at his inauguration.); see also Richards, supra note 1.
8
See Matthew F. Jordan, Obama’s iPod: Popular Music and the Perils of
Postpolitical Populism, 11 POPULAR COMM.: THE INT’L J. MEDIA AND CULTURE 99, 103
(2013) (music influences emotions and activates a sense of identification with a
candidate).
9
See id. at 103–04.
10
See Cursio, supra note 1, at 317.
11
See id. at 317–18; see also Tim Dowling, Newt Gingrich Gets a Rocky Ride for
Campaign Song, THE GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 31, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/shortcuts/2012/jan/31/newt-gingrich-sued-rocky-song; McKinley, supra note 2
(noting various candidates and their choices for campaign music).
12
See ,e.g., Dixon, supra note 5 (noting K’Naan’s resistance to Romney using a song
of his); James Frazier, Liberal Musicians Demand Conservative Pols Stop the Music,
WASH. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/1/
songwriters-have-history-of-asking-politicians-to-/?page=all.
13
See Gardner, supra note 1 (explaining that many complaints are by liberal-leaning
artists against conservative candidates); McKinley, supra note 2 (explaining that
celebrities seem to favor democrats); Richards, supra note 1 (determining that 80% of
donations from individuals in the music industry have been to democrats).
14
See Matthew Perpettua, Adam Levine to Fox News: Stop Playing My Music,
ROLLING STONE (Oct. 19, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/
adam-levine-to-fox-news-stop-playing-my-music-20111019 (in November 2011, Adam
Levine of Maroon 5 told FOX News to stop using his band’s music.)
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their music is used by politicians they do not support, others object
when it is used in any political context. 15 Indeed, in every
presidential campaign since 1996, at least one candidate has been
asked to stop playing an artist’s music. 16 During recent election
cycles, Rand Paul, 17 Michele Bachmann, 18 Mitt Romney, 19 and
Newt Gingrich 20 were all chastised by performers for using songs
without their authorization. 21
One of the most publicized incidents involved Representative
Michele Bachmann. In her bid for the Republican Presidential
nomination, Bachmann played a recording of Tom Petty’s
“American Girl” at several campaign events. 22 Presumably,
Bachmann thought the chorus “she’s an American Girl” evoked
her All-American quality and defense of mainstream American
values. 23 Petty, however, did not approve of Bachmann’s

15

Notably, Lee Greenwood does not allow his “God Bless the USA” to be used in
commercials or political rallies. See Richards, supra note 1; see also McKinley, supra
note 2 (noting fear that a song could lose its value if associated with a politician).
16
See David C. Johnston, The Singer Did Not Approve This Message: Analyzing the
Unauthorized Use of Copyrighted Music in Political Advertisements in Jackson Browne
v. John McCain?, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 688–90 (2010). In 1996, Bob Dole
modified the lyrics of Isaac Hayes and David Porter’s “Soul Man” into “Dole Man.” See
id. George W. Bush used Sting’s “Brand New Day” in 2000 and Orleans’ “Still the One”
in 2004. See id. at 689. In 2008, Mike Huckabee used Boston’s “More Than a Feeling,”
and John McCain used music by Foo Fighters, Jackson Browne, and Survivor. See id.
17
See Gardner, supra note 1 (music by Rush used during his 2010 senatorial
campaign).
18
See Dixon, supra note 5 (noting Tom Petty’s cease and desist request when
Bachmann used “American Girl”); Frazier, supra note 12 (music by Tom Petty and Katy
Perry).
19
See Dixon, supra note 5 (music by K’naan).
20
See Dowling, supra note 11 (Gingrich was sued for copyright infringement); see
also Frazier, supra note 12 (Newt Gingrich used both Survivor’s Eye of the Tiger (the
theme from Rocky III) and the UK band Heavy’s “How You Like Me Now”).
21
See Dixon, supra note 5; Frazier, supra note 12.
22
See Dixon, supra note 5; Richards, supra note 1.
23
See Richards, supra note 1. Bachmann’s song choice was questionable–aside from
the refrain, the lyrics described a girl of questionable values quite different from those
that Bachmann espoused. See Hull, supra note 7. Rick Perry’s choice of Ozzy
Osbourne’s “Crazy Train” and Rand Paul’s use of Rush’s “Tom Sawyer” were also odd.
See Richards, supra note 1.
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candidacy, and turned this into an opportunity to criticize her for
not only using the song without permission, but also her politics. 24
During the 2008 election, John McCain and the Republican
National Party were sued by Jackson Browne (an active supporter
of Barack Obama 25) because they included the chorus of “Running
on Empty” in an advertisement. 26 Ultimately, McCain was forced
to pull the advertisement and settle out of court. 27 McCain’s
running mate, Sarah Palin, experienced a similar problem. When
Palin, known in her college basketball days as “Sarah Barracuda,”
adopted Heart’s “Barracuda” as her introduction at the Republican
National Convention, Heart complained. 28 Heart did not support
Palin, but also found it ironic that she was using a song that was “a
rant against the soulless corporate nature of the music business.” 29
Even candidates who comply with copyright requirements 30
risk blowback. Last summer, Republican nominee Mitt Romney
licensed K’naan’s global hit “Wavin’ Flag.” 31 The SomaliCanadian artist nevertheless objected to Romney’s use and
released a harshly worded statement detailing his distaste for the
candidate. 32 In response, Romney ceased using the song. 33
Music can backfire in other ways, such as when a lyrically
tone-deaf candidate chooses an inappropriate song. This most
famously occurred when President Ronald Reagan referenced what
he mistakenly thought was the uplifting message of hope in Bruce

24

See Dixon, supra note 5; Richards, supra note 1. Petty also complained when
George W. Bush used “I Won’t Back Down.” Id.
25
See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
26
See Maral Vahdani, Selection from the Grammy Foundation Entertainment Law
Initiative 2010 Writing Competition: Running on Empty: The Problem with Politicians
and Stealing (Music), 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 75, 76–77 (2011-2012); Frazier, supra
note 12.
27
See Vahdani, supra note 26, at 76–77.
28
See Dowling, supra note 11; Richards, supra note 1.
29
See Frazier, supra note 12. See generally Dixon, supra note 5; Dowling, supra note
4.
30
See Dixon, supra note 5 (public performance rights are usually permitted pursuant to
a blanket license owned by the venue).
31
See id.
32
See Kidd, supra note 4.
33
See id.
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Springsteen’s “Born in the USA.” 34 Of course, anyone familiar
with Springsteen’s lyrics knew that the song was nothing of the
sort, but was, instead, an anti-war anthem criticizing the
government’s treatment of Vietnam veterans. 35 This caused both
Springsteen to object that Reagan, whom he did not support, was
co-opting his music and perverting its message, and Reagan’s
pandering to look foolish. 36
Indeed, especially in an era when social media enables
performers to communicate directly with fans, adopting music
without the artist’s blessing creates a public opportunity for a
performer to publicly rebuke the candidate. 37 For example, when
Charlie Crist used David Byrne’s “Road to Nowhere” in his failed
Senatorial campaign, the settlement required Crist to repent and
apologize on YouTube. 38
B. Performer Complaints
Because artists lack ideological veto power to prevent people
they dislike from playing their songs, 39 they have asserted that a
political campaign’s use constitutes copyright infringement,
trademark infringement, or both. The success of some musical
artists in stopping campaigns’ unauthorized use of music appears
to have emboldened others to seek redress. 40 Notwithstanding the
proliferation of these complaints, their legal foundation is
uncertain. 41 While copyright theories involve clearly defined
possessory interests and require case-by-case analyses of the facts,
34

See Cursio, supra note 1, at 318; Frazier, supra note 12; Richards, supra note 1.
See Kidd, supra note 4; Frazier, supra note 12.
36
See Dixon, supra note 5; Richards, supra note 1.
37
See Kidd, supra note 4 (noting that once artist goes public, politician may
experience public backlash); Richards, supra note 1 (indicating that complaints can lead
to public shaming).
38
See Kidd, supra note 4 (in concluding his apology, Crist promised: “I pledge that,
should there be any future election campaigns for me, I will respect and uphold the rights
of artists and obtain permission or a license for the use of any copyrighted work.”);
Richards, supra note 1.
39
See Dixon, supra note 5 (explaining that it is up to the venue holding the political
rally to purchase a blanket license and there is no other recourse to prevent a song from
being played for ideological reasons).
40
See McKinley, supra note 2; see also Frazier, supra note 12.
41
See Vahdani, supra note 26, at 77; see also Gardner, supra note 1 (explaining that
courts have not yet answered definitively the issue of unauthorized use).
35
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trademark theories implicate emerging legal issues and nuanced
aspects of trademark that are easily misconstrued and whose
application to political contexts is unclear. Additionally, this issue
not only will continue to arise until it is resolved, but also risks
diverting a candidate from the campaign trail and into the
courthouse. 42 Consequently, this Article addresses the latter issue
of a performer’s trademark interest in songs associated with her
and whether a political campaign’s use of that music
impermissibly infringes on those interests.
II. THE RIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH A SONG OR SOUND RECORDING
To determine whether a campaign’s use of music infringes on
any rights of a performer, it is necessary to analyze what rights a
vocalist possesses in a song. This requires clarifying the contours
of copyright.
For the most part, the rights related to a tangible song are
within the purview of copyright. 43 A song implicates two different
copyrights—that of the musical composition, which is possessed
by the composer or songwriter, 44 and that of the sound recording,
which usually is possessed by the producer or record company. 45
The Copyright Act gives a copyright owner a number of
exclusive rights in a musical work, including the right to perform
publicly, license, and adapt the work. 46 Most sound recording
copyrights are owned by producers or recording companies that

42

See Richards, supra note 1 (noting the diversion of resources and consequent public
shaming).
43
See Vahdani, supra note 26, at 77.
44
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2006).
45
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7). See generally, Jay Rosenthal, The Recording
Artist/Songwriter Dilemma: The Controlled Composition Clause—Enough Already!, 3
LANDSLIDE (A.B.A.), no. 4, 2011, available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
landslide_home/intelprop_landslide_VOL3n4.html.
46
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002); see also Vahdani, supra note 26, at 77. The Sound
Recording Act of 1971 granted copyright owners of sound recordings limited rights to
reproduction and distribution but no public performance rights. See Digital Performance
Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.
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produced the recording. 47
Therefore, a performer of the
copyrighted work generally does not own any rights in the work,
her performance, or the tangible recording of that performance. 48
Even when a vocalist authors the copyrighted composition,
standard industry practice typically requires relinquishment of any
rights, pursuant to contract. 49 Therefore, the copyright holders,
such as the composer and record company, could claim copyright
infringement if a sound recording or musical composition is used
at a campaign rally or in a political ad. 50 Indeed, musical artists
who have successfully sued politicians and commercial entities for
the unauthorized use of music have done so as copyright owners of
the musical compositions, not as performers of them. 51 By
contrast, most performers cannot assert such claims when they
have no rights in the copyrighted works. Additionally, if a
politician has licensed the song or sound recording, 52 the copyright
holder cannot claim infringement. 53
This has forced vocalists who wish to stop politicians from
using “their” music to look to other areas of law. Most recently,
performers have framed the issue as the song implying a “false
endorsement,” thereby infringing on a trademark interest.54
Whereas copyright protects tangible works of authorship (for
example, a musical composition or sound recording), a trademark
protects a right appurtenant to an established business or service. 55
Hence, this argument does not assert any copyright in the
47

See Rosenthal, supra note 45 (identifying the rights associated with a song and the
impact of “controlled composition clauses” on musical artists who both write and sing
their songs).
48
See Vahdani, supra note 26, at 77.
49
See Rosenthal, supra note 45.
50
See Richards, supra note 1.
51
See generally Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2011).
52
Music publishing companies, such as BMI and ASCAP, possess the right to license
the public performance rights of over 6.5 million copyrighted musical compositions. See,
e.g., Broad. Music Inc. v. Paden, No. 5:11-02199-EJD, 2011 WL 6217414, *1 (N.D. Cal.
2011).
53
See 17 U.S.C § 115; Dixon, supra note 5 (where the appropriate license fee has been
paid, the composer has no claim); McKinley, supra note 2 (copyright licensing fees are
often paid).
54
See Gardner, supra note 1.
55
See Julia Riehm McGufey, The New Edition of New Edition: Boybands,
Trademarks, and Shifting Goodwill, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 167, 168 (2008).
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composition or sound recording, but that the sound of a voice
performing a song, and as captured in the sound recording,
constitutes an aural mark, or “song mark” as used herein, denoting
the singer. 56 Therefore, when a candidate plays a song that
constitutes the song mark, it infringes on that trademark by falsely
implying that the singer endorses or is associated with the
candidate. 57 This raises a constellation of novel issues including,
whether a song could ever constitute a performer trademark; how it
would impact other rights in the musical work; and whether a use
by a politician, who is not engaged in commerce, is immune from a
false endorsement claim.
III. DEFINING TRADEMARK
A trademark is any word, name, symbol, device, or
combination thereof used to identify and distinguish businesses,
services, sources, or their goods from those of others. 59 A
trademark both denotes the commercial entity, service, or goods,
and connotes the qualities, heritage, or goodwill associated with
it. 60 In turn, the trademark guards against consumer confusion
regarding those goods and services as well as with associations
between or endorsements by them. 61
Trademarks are protected by both federal statute and common
law; § 32 of the Lanham Act protects federally registered marks 62
and § 43(a) protects both registered and certain unregistered
58

56

See Dixon, supra note 5.
See id.
58
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2010) (Trademarks are addressed in Title 15 of the
U.S. Code, the Lanham Act).
59
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768 (1992); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 3:1 (4th Ed. 2013) (the mark must be distinctive enough that it is
capable of distinguishing one source from another).
60
See Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2011); J.
Shahar Dillbary, Trademarks as a Media for False Advertising, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 327,
331–32 (2009); Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the
Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1385–86 (2011).
61
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 763.
62
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2005).
57
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marks. 63 The possessory rights of a trademark, however, only
materialize through actual, bona fide use of a mark in commerce. 64
A. A Mark’s Meaning
A wide variety of words, symbols, and devices can be used as
trademarks. 65 The United States Patent and Trademark Office
even permits registration of distinctive sound marks, 66 such as the
three-chime progression designating NBC. 67 The key is that the
means of denotation, whether aural or visual, must be capable of
transmitting meaning. 68 The mark must be able to identify the
goods or source or evoke in consumers some connotation of
quality by which the goods or source is known. 69 If the mark does
not “speak” in this way, it cannot serve as a trademark. 70
63

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012); see also Crystal Entm’t, 643 F.3d at 1320; Tumblebus
v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 760–61 (6th Cir. 2005); Gameologist Grp., LLC v. Sci. Games
Int’l, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 141, 152 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
64
See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. When ownership is asserted under common law, a putative
owner must show that it has adopted and used the mark in a way that has caused the
public to associate it with the particular service or source. See Planetary Motion, Inc. v.
Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193–94 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Crystal Entm’t,
643 F.3d at 1320–21 (trademark ownership does not arise from reserving the prerogative
to use mark in the future, but only from actual, bona fide use in commerce); Int’l
Healthcare Exch., Inc. v. Global Healthcare Exch., LLC, 470 F. Supp. 2d 365, 371
(S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“The talismanic test is whether or not the mark was used in a way
sufficiently public to identify or distinguish the marked goods in an appropriate segment
of the public mind as those of the adopter of the mark.”).
65
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000); Qualitex
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995).
66
See In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978);
Daniel R. Bumpus, Bing, Bang, Boom: An Analysis Of In re Vertex Group LLC and the
Struggle for Inherent Distinctiveness in Sound Marks Made During a Product’s Normal
Course of Operation, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 245, 248–49 (2011). According to the United
States Patent and Trademark Office’s Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure’s §
1202.15 Sound Marks: “A sound mark identifies and distinguishes a product or service
through audio rather than visual means. Sound marks function as source indicators when
they ‘assume a definitive shape or arrangement’ and ‘create in the hearer’s mind an
association of the sound’ with a good or service.” TMEP § 1202.15. (quoting Gen.
Electric, 199 U.S.P.Q. at 563).
67
See Bumpus, supra note 66, at 246.
68
See id. at 249; see also Heymann, supra note 60, at 1385–86 (describing naming and
denotation function of trademarks).
69
See Crystal Entm’t, 643 F.3d at 1322; Bell v. Streetwise Records, Ltd., 640 F. Supp.
575, 581 (D. Mass. 1986); see also Kenneth L. Port, On Nontraditional Trademarks, 38
N. KY. L. REV. 1, 47 (2011) (explaining that nontraditional marks may prompt association
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B. A Mark’s Distinctiveness
A mark must also be distinctive. 71 A mark can be distinctive in
either of two ways. It can be inherently distinctive 72 or acquire
distinctiveness by developing a secondary meaning. 73 A mark is
inherently distinctive when its intrinsic nature identifies a
particular source or business. 74 This is true of words and marks
that are “arbitrary” or “fanciful,” 75 such as Nestlé or Purell,
because they “almost automatically tell a customer that they refer
to a brand.” 76 A mark can also acquire distinctiveness when,
through use in commerce and over time, it develops a secondary
meaning. 77 Secondary meaning is achieved when the public comes
to understand the mark as identifying the service or product source
rather than the product itself or a product feature. 78 If it is not
reasonable to assume that a consumer would think a mark indicates

in the mind of the consumer between the sound and the brand); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone
in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507, 508,
514 (2008) (research shows that exposure to a mark can trigger emotions in the mind of
consumers and that consumers transfer feelings about advertising and trademarks to the
products themselves).
70
See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 59, at § 3:1.
71
See Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619,
635 (6th Cir. 2002); MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader, No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S
Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Whereas inherently distinctive sounds do not
require proof of acquired distinctiveness, common sounds or sounds made by a product in
its normal course of operation require proof that the sound has become distinctive in the
mind of consumers through their use in connection with the manufacturer. See Bumpus,
supra note 66, at 246–47; In re Vertex Grp. LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1694, 1699
(T.T.A.B. 2009).
72
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2000).
73
See id. at 212.
74
See id. at 215–16; see also G.M.L., Inc. v. Mayhew, 188 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (M.D.
Tenn. 2002) (describing inherently distinctive marks); MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader
2000 Primary Comm. Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).
75
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212.
76
See id. at 213; Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162–63 (1995)
(emphasis in original).
77
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212; In re Gen. Electric Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (distinguishing inherently distinctive sounds from those
requiring proof of acquired distinctiveness).
78
See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213; Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 162–63; Inwood Labs., Inc. v.
Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 (1982).
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a product source, as opposed to describing a product, product
feature, or geographic origin, the mark is not distinctive. 79
The Supreme Court has stressed that without inherent
distinctiveness or secondary meaning, there can be no trademark. 80
For example, in Wal-Mart v. Samara Brothers, Wal-Mart
produced “knock-offs” of the clothing designed and manufactured
by Samara Brothers. 81 Samara Brothers asserted that Wal-Mart’s
knock-offs infringed on their trade dress. 82 The case turned on
whether product-design trade dress could be inherently distinctive
so as to function as a trademark. The Court concluded that unless
the clothing designs had taken on some secondary meaning 83
transcending their nature as clothes and becoming a “mark”
designating their manufacturer, they could not be trademarks. 84
The Court also explained that trademark’s “carefully considered
limitation would be entirely pointless” if an “original” producer
such as Samara Brothers were permitted to raise this type of
reverse-passing-off claim. 85
With regard to an aural identifier or sound mark, a sound that
becomes so distinctive that consumers associate it with a source or
brand (such as NBC’s chimes) can possess secondary meaning,
and can thus be trademarked. 86 By contrast, a sound that a product
makes in its normal course of operation, such as the beep of a cell
phone, or is heard in another context cannot possess secondary
meaning and cannot be trademarked. 87
79

See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 213.
See id. at 212. (noting that only “over time” could color, for example, come to be
seen as signifying a brand).
81
Id. at 207–08.
82
Id. at 208–09.
83
Id. at 211.
84
Id. at 216.
85
This would create a conundrum where a trademark owner who was not identified
could raise an infringement claim, but if it was accurately identified, it could raise a false
endorsement claim.
86
See Bumpus, supra note 66, at 246; see also In re Gen. Electric Broad. Co., 199
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (where the PTO explained that “a sound mark
depends upon aural perception of the listener . . . [so] when heard [it is] associated with
the source or event . . . .”)
87
See In re Vertex Grp., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1694,1699; Bumpus, supra note 66, at
246–47.
80
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IV. CONSTRUCTING A THEORY OF SONG MARK PROTECTION
A. Music as an Entertainment Service or Brand Quality
The threshold issue in a singer aural trademark claim is
whether a song can be registered as a trademark designating the
vocal performer. 88 If it cannot be, then there is no protectable
trademark, and there can be no trademark infringement. 89
Although courts have not addressed song mark claims in politics, a
few have considered song-based trademark claims in commercial
contexts. 90 This jurisprudence is a necessary starting point.
A trademark cannot exist in the abstract, but obtains meaning
only in relation to that which that it designates. 91 Therefore,
before there can be a trademark, there must be a service or
business to mark. 92 To illustrate, a few years after Cab Calloway’s
death, Christopher Brooks formed “The Cab Calloway Orchestra”
which honored Calloway’s musical legacy by performing vintage
Calloway songs using their original arrangements. 93 Calloway’s
relatives sued Brooks, alleging that his use of “Cab Calloway”
constituted trademark infringement. 94
The Second Circuit explained that “a trademark is merely a
symbol of goodwill and cannot be sold or assigned apart from the
goodwill it symbolizes.” 95 Because goodwill is inseparable from
the underlying business that it denotes, trademark rights cannot be
transferred apart from an ongoing business. 96
Though
“entertainment” services could be indicated by a service mark, at
88

See Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc., 502 F.3d 504, 513 (6th Cir.
2007) (noting that registration of a trademark creates a rebuttable presumption of
validity).
89
See id. at 512–13; Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754, 760–61 (6th Cir.
2005).
90
See G.M.L., Inc. v. Mayhew, 188 F. Supp. 2d 891, 895 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
91
See EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmuplos Inc., 228 F.3d 56,
62 (2d Cir. 2000).
92
See Bumpus, supra note 66, at 251.
93
Creative Arts by Calloway v. Brooks, 48 F. App’x. 16, 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
94
Id. at 17.
95
Id. at 17–18.
96
See id.; Marshak v. Green, 746 F.2d 927, 929 (2d Cir. 1984) (“There are no rights in
a trademark apart from the business with which the mark has been associated; they are
inseparable.”).
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the time of his death, Calloway was not operating as such. 97 As a
result, there was no entertainment service to mark, and, thus, no
trademark in “Cab Callaway” to transfer. 98 Consequently, there
was no trademark on which to infringe. 99
Other courts, however, have permitted the names of musical
groups to be transferred by contract and trademarked. 100 Indeed,
both musical groups ABBA and New Edition have prevailed in
actions to trademark their names. 101 In the latter, New Edition’s
former manager attempted to reconstitute a new version of the
singing group under the name “New Edition.” 102 The original
members of the group objected, claiming that they owned the mark
“New Edition.” 103 Because neither could assert senior ownership
of the mark, ownership rested on ascertaining what audiences
understood “New Edition” to designate and determining who
controlled those qualities. 104 The court found that “New Edition”
stood for “first and foremost the [unique combination of singers]
with their distinctive personalities and style as performers.” 105
Because the original members controlled those characteristics, the
court awarded them ownership of the trademark. 106
97

Calloway, 48 Fed. Appx. at 17–18.
Id.
99
Id. at 18.
100
A band name is sometimes deemed a service mark because it promotes
entertainment services. See Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“Entertainment” may be considered a service in connection with the law of service
marks); McGufey, supra note 55, at 170; see also Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks v. Jurado,
643 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing ownership of and trademark rights
associated with the singing group Exposé); In re Polar Music Int’l AB, 714 F.2d 1567,
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 59, at § 16:45. The mark or name
designates both a service as well as the particular combination of performers that cannot
otherwise be expressed. See Matthew D. Bunker, You Can’t Handle the Truth (in Music):
Does the Lanham Act Preempt State “Truth in Music” Laws?, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1,
12–13 (2011).
101
See Polar Music, 714 F.2d at 1571–72 (the corporate entity submitted a license
evidencing its right to control the quality of the musical group’s sound recordings,
thereby demonstrating that it controlled the quality of the sound recordings); Bell v.
Streetwise Records, Ltd., 640 F. Supp. 575, 580–82 (D. Mass. 1986).
102
Bell, 640 F. Supp. at 581.
103
Id. at 580–81.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 581–82.
106
Id. at 580–82; see also Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks v. Jurado, 643 F.3d 1313,1322–
23 (11th Cir. 2011) (the entity claiming ownership of the trademark Exposé failed to
98
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Applying this to a song mark, to the extent that a performer
provides entertainment services, she could designate those services
by a trademark. That mark, however, would designate only the
commercial musical or vocal services. It would not be a personal
alias equivalent to the performer independent of those services, 107
and the performer would not own the song or have an exclusive
right to use it as a mark in connection with other services. 108
B. The “Mark” of a Song Mark
Next, that which is proffered as the song mark must be among
the words, sounds, or combination thereof that can be registered as
a mark. The theory of a song mark is that the sound of a singer’s
voice performing the musical composition and captured in a sound
recording functions as a mark designating the performer. 109 The
proposed song mark, therefore, is a hybrid of: the foundational
musical composition, the singer’s vocal performance of it, the
instrumental performances; and the sound recording containing
these, as mixed by the producer. Each of these elements is
discussed below.
C. Voice or Vocal Performance
With regard to whether voice can be a signifier, it could be
thought of as a sound. As noted, distinctive sounds and aural
signifiers able to evoke a source or service can be registered as
sound marks. 110 A few California courts have protected a
distinctive human voice as a trademark where it is a widely known
prove control over the singing group’s qualities, scheduling of performances, and
management); New Kids on the Block v. News America Pub., Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 304
(9th Cir. 1992).
107
See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922–23 (6th Cir. 2003)
(rejecting Tiger Woods’ claim that he, as a person, can be trademarked); Pirone v.
MacMillian, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 582–84 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that Babe Ruth pictures
are not entitled to trademark protection unless they serve an “origin-indicating function”).
108
See Gameologist Grp., LLC v. Sci. Games Int’l, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 141,153
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that rights to a trademark extend only to the goods and services
noted in a registration certificate).
109
See Bumpus, supra note 66, at 262.
110
See In re Vertex Grp., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1694, 1699 (T.T.A.B. 2009); In re
Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978) (sound must be
distinctive and evoke in consumers an association with the business); Bumpus, supra
note 66, at 246.
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indicator of the vocalist’s identity. 111 Indeed, both Tom Waits and
Bette Midler have prevailed in actions to protect their voices as
unregistered commercial trademarks of their respective vocal
identities. 112
The Third Circuit has also embraced the notion that voice
could indicate the services of a person famous for voice work. 113
During his storied career, sports announcer John Facenda narrated
a number of NFL Films productions. 114 Facenda’s deep baritone
had been described as “distinctive,” “recognizable,” and known by
many football fans as “the Voice of God.” 115 Years after his death,
NFL Films used portions of his voice-overs in a television
documentary entitled “The Making of Madden NFL 06.” 116
Facenda’s Estate sued NFL Films for trademark infringement,
claiming that using “sound samples” of Facenda’s voice falsely
implied that Facenda endorsed the video game. 117 For purposes of
ruling on the NFL’s motion to dismiss, the court treated Facenda’s
voice as a trademark. 118
It is important to keep in mind that these decisions did not
grant the performer a trademark in a song, but allowed an
established commercial service to be marked with a distinctive
sound (voice) recognized by the public as designating that
111

See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462–63 (9th Cir. 1988) (if voice is sufficient indicia of a
celebrity’s identity, it can be an unregistered trademark); see also Facenda v. NFL Films,
542 F.3d 1007, 1018 (3d Cir. 2008) (upholding a trademark claim because Facenda’s
voice was considered a distinctive mark); David Tan, Much Ado About Evocation: A
Cultural Analysis of “Well-Knownness” and the Right of Publicity, 28 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 317, 330–31 (2010).
112
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1110 (“A false endorsement claim based on the unauthorized use
of a celebrity’s identity is a type of false association claim, for it alleges the misuse of a
trademark, i.e., a symbol or device such as a visual likeness, vocal imitation, or other
uniquely distinguishing characteristic . . . .”); Midler, 849 F.2d at 463–64.
113
Facenda, 542 F.3d at 1013.
114
Id. at 1011.
115
Id. at 1011–12. In fact, NFL Films had released works featuring what it called “the
Legendary Voice of John Facenda.” Id. at 1012.
116
Id. at 1011.
117
Id. at 1011, 1014. The NFL asserted that its copyright in the original NFL Films
productions gave it the right to use the soundtracks of those productions in any way they
wished. Id. at 1013.
118
Id. at 1014.
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performer’s services. Furthermore, although a unique voice like
Facenda’s or Waits’s, recognizable independent of context or the
foundational copyrighted work, can serve as a mark, it does not
mean that most voices can. These plaintiffs were well-known
vocal performers 119 with unique vocal qualities. Yet, with
“Autotune” and contemporary production techniques, today’s
singers are often indistinguishable or recognized in relation to a
record rather than due to some unusual vocal quality. Therefore,
voice alone is not presumptively distinct, and even when it is, that
does not prove audience recognition. 120 Furthermore, the concept
of identity is not boundless. Even courts that construe identity
broadly require that it be used conspicuously, either by directly
using the trademarked name or image or by emphasizing its iconic
symbols. 121 It is questionable whether merely including a singer’s
voice or playing a record meets this standard of a conspicuous use
of the performer’s identity. 122
D. The Musical Composition and Sound Recording
A song mark is more than the sound of a distinctive,
recognizable voice—it also includes the vocal performance of the
copyrighted musical work, the instrumental performances, mixing
and production techniques, and the resulting sound recording. 123
A musical composition or record might be likened to a long
jingle. Courts have acknowledged that a musical “jingle” can

119

See Tan, supra note 111 at 341–43, 349, (asserting that a celebrity must establish
“well-known-ness” by a substantial portion of the public).
120
See White v. Samsung, 989 F.2d 1512, 1516 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (claims are often made by people with an exaggerated sense of their fame and
pop culture significance).
121
See Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t., No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 WL
2156318, at *10 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013) (“[T]he defendant’s work must make some
affirmative statement of the plaintiff’s sponsorship or endorsement, beyond the mere use
of plaintiff’s name or other characteristic”); Arenas v. Shed Media, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1181,
1189 (C.D. Cal. 2011); see also Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 829,
838 (S.D. Ind. 2011).
122
See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that
the mere use of the record including her voice would not, alone, amount to use of
identity).
123
See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2011).
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function as a brand identifier or trademark. 124 Therefore, if a vocal
sound and a jingle can each be trademarked, then, perhaps, a
singer’s vocal sound heard in a sound recording (essentially a long
jingle) could be combined and trademarked as a song mark.
This proposition, however, rests on the premise that a musical
composition or sound recording is nothing more than a mere jingle.
This draws a false equivalency. Although virtually every jingle is
a musical composition, most musical compositions are not jingles.
A jingle is limited, not only in length, but also in its character and
purpose. 125 At its inception, a jingle is conceived to be an aural
logo of a brand, 126 and nothing more. There is no intent to sell it
on iTunes or remix it as a dance recording. Instead, a jingle is used
in a brand’s advertisements to evoke a commercial impression. 127
Once cultivated, it is understood by consumers to function
exclusively in this way.
A musical work possesses an entirely different character, and
does not alone produce a commercial impression. 128 Songs and
sound recordings are not intended as aural means to connote brand
qualities. Rather, music is a creative expression and an end
product—it is meant to be heard, enjoyed, critiqued, and purchased
as music. 129 Audiences listen to music to mend broken hearts,
celebrate, unwind, or energize a workout, not to differentiate
among commercial sources. When viewers hear a Lady Gaga song
during The Weather Channel’s “Local on the 8s,” they do not
124

See id.; Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 761 (D.N.J. 2011) (noting that
college “fight songs” are licensed pursuant to trademark); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F.
Supp. 2d 1144, 1167–68 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (analyzing jurisprudence and concluding that
musical compositions are generally worthy of trademark protection, as they could
become associated with a particular product); G.M.L. v. Mayhew, 188 F. Supp. 2d 891,
893 (M.D. Tenn. 2002).
125
See Henley, 733 F. Supp. at 1151.
126
See G.M.L., 188 F. Supp. at 896.
127
See id. at 895.
128
See id. at 896; see also EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmuplos
Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that musical composition cannot be a
trademark for itself).
129
See EMI, 228 F.3d at 64 (noting that a musical composition cannot serve as a
trademark because it is copyrighted musical work); G.M.L., 188 F. Supp. at 896
(explaining that a musical composition or sound recording is not a designation of source
but a good itself).
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presume that the song designates winter weather, is a jingle of the
network, or represents Lady Gaga’s endorsement of either. 130
E. Performance of a Musical Work
Because audiences understand a song as a creative work rather
than as a commercial signifier, a song cannot signify itself. 131 The
only function it could have would be to signify itself as music. 132
This is consistent with how courts have interpreted trademark
claims involving music. In rejecting such claims by singers, courts
have held that a “signature performance” cannot create a
trademark. 133
The first in this line of cases involved the 1960s hit song “The
Girl from Ipanema.” 134 In 1964, singer Astrud Gilberto recorded
“The Girl from Ipanema.” 135 It launched her career, won her a
Grammy Award, and became a signature song that she performed
frequently thereafter. 136 Decades later, Frito-Lay licensed the
record from the copyright owner and used it in a television
advertisement. 137 Gilberto, however, claimed that her frequent
performances of “The Girl from Ipanema” had caused the public to

130

130
Furthermore, usually any meaning a listener assigns to a song is derived from its
lyrics (as Regan did). The lyrics are the literal message of the creative work, not
secondary to it.
131
See EMI, 228 F.3d at 64 (“[A] musical composition cannot be protected as its own
trademark under the Lanham Act . . . cases involving trademark infringement should be
those alleging the appropriation of symbols or devices that identify the composition or its
source, not the appropriation or copying or imitation of the composition itself.”).
132
See id.; G.M.L., 188 F. Supp. at 896.
133
See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2011) (indicating that a
performance does not give singer rights in the recording of “signature performances”);
L.A. Triumph, Inc. v. Ciccone, No. CV 10-06195 SJO (JCx), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132057, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011) (noting that the performance of a song does not
bestow on the performer a trademark); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1167–
68 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (highlighting that a performer cannot possess a trademark in a
performance of a musical composition); Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052,
1059 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (explaining that performing artists cannot possess a trademark in a
performance of song).
134
Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 59.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 58–59.
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identify her with the song, making it her trademark. 138 She thus
claimed that Frito Lay’s use infringed on her trademark and was
likely to deceive consumers about her affiliation with the Frito-Lay
brand or her approval of its products. 139
Although the Second Circuit accepted the proposition that a
jingle could be a trademark, 140 it rejected Gilberto’s contention that
a performance of a composition could mature into an unregistered
trademark. 141 Instead, it held that the performance of a musical
composition could not serve as a trademark for itself, so Gilberto
could not possess a trademark of the song. 142 Speaking to the issue
of song-based trademarks more broadly, the court warned that
granting a song the status of trademark would give performers a
previously unknown right that would alter the commercial world’s
understanding of the scope of trademark and profoundly disrupt
commerce. 143 Indeed, it would enable performers and copyright
authors to license works and then turn around and sue licensees for
trademark infringement. 144
Other courts have concurred that the performance of a song
cannot be leveraged into a singer trademark. 145 A few years ago,
138

Id. Indeed, she asserted that the public thought of her as the girl from Ipanema. Id.
at 59.
139
Id. at 57–58.
140
Id. at 61.
141
Id. at 62–63.
142
Id. at 62; see also Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 712 (9th
Cir. 1970) (rejecting singer Nancy Sinatra’s claim that the song had been so popularized
by her, “that her name is identified with it” and it had acquired a secondary meaning). In
Oliveira, the court added that no reasonable fact-finder could find that the audience
would believe the song constituted an endorsement by her. Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 60.
143
Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 62–63. As the EMI court noted:
Concluding that a song can serve as an identifying mark of the song
itself would stretch the definition of trademark—and the protection
afforded under § 43(a)—too far and give trademark law a role in
protecting the very essence of the song, an unwarranted extension
into an area already protected by copyright law.
EMI Catalogue P’Ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmuplos Inc., 228 F.3d 56, 64 (2d
Cir. 2000).
144
See Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 63.
145
See L.A. Triumph, Inc. v. Ciccone, No. CV 10-06195 SJO (JCx), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 132057, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011); Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d
1144, 1167–68 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1059
(C.D. Cal. 2004).
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Madonna sought to trademark “Material Girl” to identify her
Another women’s clothing
women’s clothing line. 146
manufacturer that previously had used “Material Girl” as its
trademark, objected to her registration. 147 Madonna moved to
dismiss, asserting that she was the senior owner of the trademark
“Material Girl,” 148 by virtue of having performed and been in the
video of the song “Material Girl” in the 1980s. 149 In denying the
motion, the court explained that since a singer cannot create a
trademark by performing a song, 150 Madonna could not have
earned the trademark “Material Girl” by singing it. 151
The result is no different when the performer also authors the
copyrighted composition on which the trademark is based—
copyright might be implicated, but trademark is not. For example,
Digable Planets accused Target of copyright and trademark
infringement for using the lyrics and sound recording of its
signature song “Rebirth of Slick (Cool like Dat)” 152 in a print, instore ad campaign. 153 Although the court permitted Digable
Planets’ copyright infringement claim based on the use of the
alteration of the song’s lyrics, it dismissed the trademark claim,
stating that a trademark cannot arise from a performance. 154
Singer-songwriter Don Henley was similarly rebuffed when he
complained that his music was used in political ads of a candidate
146

Ciccone, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132057, at *6–7.
Id. (the “first to use a mark is deemed the ‘senior’ user and has the right to enjoin
‘junior’ users from using confusingly similar marks in the same industry and
market . . . .”) (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d
1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999)). In Ciccone, the manufacturer had used the name “Material
Girl” under a California trademark that had expired. Id. at *2.
148
Id. at *6–7.
149
Id.; cf. Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711, 712 (9th Cir. 1970)
(Sinatra claimed that because she popularized a song, her name was identified with it).
150
Because Madonna could not have owned the trademark from her musical
performance, she could not prove that she was the owner or senior user of the mark
“Material Girl,” over the clothing manufacturer. Ciccone, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
132057, at *6–7.
151
Id. at *7.
152
Butler v. Target Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1054 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
153
Id. at 1059. The advertising campaign featured altered versions of the song with
slogans such as “Jeans Like That,” “Denim Like That,” and “Shoes Like That.” Id. at
1054.
154
Id. at 1059–60.
147
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he did not support. 155 There, Republican candidate Charles
Devore 156 had seen an Obama sticker on a Toyota Prius, which
reminded him of the “DEADHEAD sticker on a Cadillac” lyric in
Henley’s “Boys of Summer.” 157 This inspired Devore to write a
campaign song entitled “The Hope of November.” “The Hope of
November” followed the melody of “The Boys of Summer” but
made fun of Barack Obama and Nancy Pelosi. 158 Next, DeVore
wrote “All She Wants to Do is Tax” which used the melody of
“All She Wants to Do Is Dance” but inserted lyrics criticizing
Barbara Boxer. 159 DeVore’s campaign team then recorded the new
lyrics to karaoke tracks of the Henley songs and used their new
versions in two campaign ads and YouTube videos. 160
Henley, the singer and copyright owner of the tunes, sued
DeVore for both copyright and trademark infringement. 161 The
court permitted his copyright claims, but dismissed his trademark
claims. 162 It explained that since a performance of a copyrighted
work cannot vest in a performer a trademark, the unauthorized use
of a copyrighted work could not violate any trademark of the
performer. 163 The court added that since it was clear that Henley
was not singing the song, the public would not have mistakenly
believed that he was associated with the candidate. 164
F. Can a Song Attain Secondary Meaning?
In rejecting song trademark claims, courts have explained that
a musical composition or sound recording cannot be a trademark of
itself. 165 That a performance of a song cannot function as a
trademark indicating the song, however, does not foreclose the
possibility that it could function as a trademark indicating
something else. After all, a jingle does not designate its musical
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
Devore was a California Assembly member at the time. Id. at 1148.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1149.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1168.
See generally Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2011).
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notes or singer, but the commercial entity, service, or brand with
which it is associated. 166 Obviously, a vocalist asserting a song
mark is not claiming that her performance included in the sound
recording designates the song, but that it denotes her as a singer.
Therefore, just as a jingle indicates a brand, the song mark plus her
voice would be a jingle indicating the singer.
To function in this way, the song would need to transcend the
creative work and achieve secondary meaning. 167 In other words,
when the audience heard the song, it must automatically think of
the singer’s entertainment services, not the music or lyrics of the
creative work. For a number of reasons, it is doubtful that a song
can shed its inherent nature as a creative work and acquire an
unrelated secondary meaning.
First, a sound that a product makes in the normal course of its
operation or to which listeners have been exposed under different
circumstances lacks inherent distinctiveness, so cannot be
trademarked. 168 Because a singer (albeit through voice) performs
the notes and lyrics that the composition tells it to, or that the
producer has mixed into the sound recording, the voice is merely
making the sounds “made” in the normal course of performing the
composition or playing the record. It, therefore, has no secondary
meaning. 169 In fact, if the song could be used as a commercial
indicator, it is more reasonable that it would inure to either the
composer who wrote and licensed it or the record company that
produced and marketed the recording.
Second, any more precise meaning that a song has to listeners
is based on its lyrics. Yet, this is literally the meaning of or
communicated by the creative work, not distinct from it. For
example, it was the up-tempo chorus of “Born in the USA” that
caused President Regan to conclude that the song celebrated being
166

See supra note 126.
See Bumpus, supra note 66, at 246; Port, supra note 69, at 47.
168
See Nextel Commc’ns., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1393, 1404 (T.T.A.B
2009) (asserting that the “chirp” of cell phone cannot be trademarked because it is a
sound in the normal course of the product’s operation); In Re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199
U.S.P.Q (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
169
Additionally, listeners would initially become familiar with the song in something
other than a commercial context, such as a song on the radio or iTunes.
167
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an American, and to use it to underscore his pro-USA point. 170 In
a similar vein, when Michelle Bachmann appeared on Late Night
with Jimmy Fallon, The Roots played “Lyin’ Ass Bitch” as her
introduction. 171 Listeners who recognized the song deduced that
the band was communicating its negative opinion of Bachmann. 172
In fact, Bachmann supporters complained and the show later
apologized for the song choice due to its title and lyrics.
Additionally, any message was imputed to The Roots who played
the song, not its original singer. 173 Again, that meaning is not
secondary to or different from the lyrics, but a literal translation. 174
Finally, even if the song achieved secondary meaning, the
public would not necessarily presume that it designated the
commercial services of the vocalist. If the song became popular in
conjunction with a brand advertisement, movie, or fictional
product in a television show, 175 the audience would associate it
with those. Indeed, this is how a jingle operates. For example, the
song “Bad Things to You” is known as the theme song to HBO’s
show True Blood. If True Blood fans hear “Bad Things to You,” it
is far more likely that they would think of the TV show than singer
Jace Everret’s entertainment services. As such, the song’s
secondary meaning would be the musical identifier of True Blood.

170

See Frazier, supra note 12.
See Russell Goldman, Jimmy Fallon Drummer Calls Bachmann ‘Bitch’ Song
‘Tongue in Cheek’, ABC NEWS (Nov. 22, 2011, 4:37 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/
blogs/politics/2011/11/jimmy-fallons-drummer-grounded-for-bachmanns-bitch-song.
172
See id. This was an easy presumption considering that Questlove’s Twitter avatar
was a photo of him hugging President Obama.
173
See id.
174
It follows that when an audience at a Michele Bachmann campaign event hears
“American Girl,” it simply enjoys the song or relates its lyrics to Bachmann as “an
American girl,” rather than deducing that Tom Petty endorses Bachmann.
175
For example, Breaking Bad’s Emmy-nominated episode included a brilliant,
memorable montage to the 1969 song “Crystal Blue Persuasion.” Whereas college-aged
fans of Breaking Bad associate the song with Heisenberg’s blue crystal meth, singer
Tommy James understands the song to reflect his conversion to Christianity. Interview by
Shawna Hansen Ortega with Tommy James (Sept. 15, 2009). Hence, the respective
cohorts and context would impact the audience’s understanding of the song.
171
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V. TRADEMARKS FOUNDED ON COPYRIGHTED WORKS
Assuming that a song mark could exist (and aside from any
issue of preemption discussed below), it is doubtful that a
trademark could be registered “on” another party’s copyrighted
work. 176 As noted, a song mark is comprised of the copyrighted
musical composition and the sound recording that mixes the vocal
and instrumental performances. Dastar instructs that when a
trademark is asserted over a copyrightable work, the copyrighted
work is the base point for analysis. 177
Although the Copyright Act awards the copyright owner of the
composition and, to a lesser extent, the sound recording the right to
control its use, performance, and distribution, including whether to
withhold it or make it available, 178 it does not give a performer any
such rights; performing a copyrighted work pursuant to permission
is not a mechanism to convert a third party’s copyrighted work into
a trademark. 179 Hence, the actor does not earn a right in a movie
by emoting in it, a singer does not realize a right in a song by
singing it, and a musician does not obtain a right in a musical score
by playing it. Rather, these performances are permitted only by
copyright and, once captured in a tangible medium, are subsumed
by copyright. 180 If it were otherwise, a song mark would enable a
singer to control the composition, thereby extinguishing the rights
granted by the Copyright Act. 181
Accordingly, a vocalist

176

Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned against over-extending trademark into
areas traditionally occupied by copyright. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox,
539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29
(2001).
177
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 35 (“Without a copyrighted work as the basepoint, the word
“origin” has no discernible limits.”). Much like a song mark that rests on a copyrighted
work, the trademark infringement claim in Dastar was premised on a work whose
copyright had expired.
178
See Vahdani, supra note 24, at 77.
179
See generally Dastar, 539 U.S. at 34; TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29 (explaining that the
Lanham Act should not be extended to cover areas that are traditionally the concern of
copyright).
180
See Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 650–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
181
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 119(b) (2010) (discussing compulsory licenses); 17 U.S.C. §
114(b) (2010).
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trademark could not be premised on someone else’s copyrighted
work. 182
For example, in Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire, 183 singer Nancy
Sinatra claimed that her hit single “These Boots Are Made for
Walking” had taken on a secondary meaning, becoming hers. 184
Sinatra was disabused of this notion when she unsuccessfully sued
Goodyear Tire for using the composition in an advertisement. 185
Goodyear licensed the composition from the copyright owners, had
other performers cover it, and included the new version in a
commercial. 186 Sinatra insisted that because it was her signature
song, Goodyear could not use the composition without her
permission. In rejecting her claim, the court explained that the
song that made Sinatra famous was not hers, had never been hers,
and gave her no rights. 187 Rather, she presumably had obtained
permission from of the copyright owner to record it and had she
wanted to prevent anyone else from ever using it so that she could
cultivate secondary meaning, she could have purchased those
rights. 188
The same is true of performances memorialized in other types
of copyrighted media. In Fleet v. CBS, CBS purchased the
exclusive rights to distribute a movie in which the plaintiff actors
appeared. 189 The third party producers of the film, however, had
failed to pay the actors’ salaries. 190 Unable to obtain payment
from the movie’s producers, the actors sued CBS alleging that
airing the film—which included their likenesses—violated their

182

See EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmuplos Inc., 228 F.3d 56,
64 (2d Cir. 2000). If a musical composition could be protected as its own trademark, any
copyright claim for infringement of rights in a musical composition would be converted
automatically into a Lanham Act cause of action. In theory, a singer might trademark a
replicable sound or create a jingle to designate their entertainment services or other
commercial pursuit, but the singer trademark could not co-opt a copyrighted work. See id.
183
435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970).
184
Id. at 711–12.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 711.
187
Id. at 716.
188
Id.
189
Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 645, 650–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
190
Id. at 647.
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right of publicity. 191 In holding the claim preempted, 192 the court
observed that it was not merely the plaintiffs’ likenesses that were
captured on film, but their dramatic performances of the
copyrighted work. 193 Once these were captured on film, “they
became ‘dramatic work[s]’ ‘fixed in [a] tangible medium of
expression . . . .” 194
Permitting a performer to wield a song trademark would create
a “mutant species” of copyright. 195 Because copyrights have a
limited life span, 196 but trademarks can be renewed, 197 an owner of
a song mark would possess a perpetual monopoly over a
copyrighted sound recording and composition. Yet, such a
perpetual copyright is forbidden by the Copyright Act and is
unconstitutional. 198 Additionally, there is evidence that Congress
did not overlook the reputational interests of singers, but declined
to protect them under Trademark law. For example, under the
Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA), 199 an author of a work of visual
art can prevent the use of her name as the creator of a work that
she did not create or when her work has been modified in a way
that “would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.” 200
Congress did not extend this protection to performers and even
VARA grants a relatively narrow right that does not give artists the
power to guard against unwanted associations. 201 Additionally, §
191

Id.
Id. at 646.
193
Id. at 651.
194
Id. at 650 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
195
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003). In Oliveira v.
Frito-Lay, Inc. the court presumed that if there were a trademark in a song, it would be
owned by the copyright owner. Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2011)
(explaining that the composer might license the use under copyright, and then turn around
and sue under trademark).
196
See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33–35.
197
See Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc., 308 F.3d 1156, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
198
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37. Further complicating the concept of a song mark is that it
would be tied to the acts of third parties. Presumably, if a song was not played by a DJ or
was a hit, it would not insinuate itself into the public’s psyche and, thus, could not
materialize into a protectable mark.
199
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
200
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (A)(a)(1), (2), (3)(A) (2002).
201
See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (A). In fact, § 115 provides for a compulsory license for
musical compositions: as long as the licensee complies with the statute, a copyright
owner cannot prevent a third party from using or covering the copyrighted composition.
192
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115 of the Copyright Act provides for a compulsory license for
musical compositions—as long as the licensee complies with the
statute, a copyright owner cannot prevent a third party from using
or covering the copyrighted composition. 202 If the author or
copyright owner of the composition cannot prevent someone from
using the work pursuant to a compulsory license, it makes no sense
that a mere performer of that work could be able to do so. Indeed,
Dastar’s trademark infringement claim rested on a work whose
copyright had expired. Nevertheless, the Court rejected it, because
it would “cause[] the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of
copyright.” 203 If a trademark cannot be founded on an expired
copyright work, a trademark cannot reasonably be erected on an
existing copyrighted work. 204
VI. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Assuming, arguendo, that a song mark can exist, a campaign’s
using of the mark, that is, playing a song, without more, does not
constitute infringement. Although the Lanham Act grants a
trademark owner a number of exclusive rights, it does not grant her
a right to control all uses of a mark. 205 To the contrary, anyone
may use a trademark or benefit from its goodwill if there is no
secondary significance 206 or commercial activity implicated. 207
17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 114(b) (2010). If the author or copyright owner of the composition
cannot prevent someone from using the work pursuant to a compulsory license, it makes
no sense that a mere performer of that work could be able to do so.
202
17 U.S.C. §§ 115, 114(b).
203
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 33 (2003).
204
See d. at 34 (doing so would create a species of mutant copyright law that limits the
public’s “federal right to ‘copy and to use,’ expired copyrights.”).
205
See id. (the Lanham Act grants a trademark owner a number of exclusive rights, but
these rights are more circumscribed than those of copyright. Courts must not over-extend
trademark into areas traditionally occupied by copyright); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
206
See TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29; Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 505 U.S. 763, 767–68
(1992).
207
See Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695
(6th Cir. 2003) (trademark infringement does not apply when a trademark is used in a
“non-trademark” way); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302,
307 (9th Cir. 1992) (infringement laws “simply do not apply” to a “non-trademark use of
a mark”); 4 LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES, § 22:25 (4th ed. 2013) (noting that one who uses the
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Additionally:
There is a distinction between the rights that flow
from ownership, most notably the exclusive right to
use the registered mark in commerce, and the
remedies—including an owner’s right to enjoin
another person’s use of a mark—that ripen only
when there is . . . a likelihood of confusion. 208
Thus, reflecting the semiotic and prophylactic functions of
trademark, a trademark owner has a right to protect the accrued
value of the mark and prevent the misperception that it sources,
provides, is associated with, or sponsors a service or a product. 209
Therefore, the use of a trademark infringes only if it misleads
consumers into believing that the trademark owner manufactures,
provides, sponsors, or is affiliated with the defendant’s service,
business, or products. 210 Even then, trademark infringement
protects against only mistaken consumer decisions or commercial
matters, 211 but not confusion generally. 212
A. Types of Infringement
Trademark infringement takes different forms. The most
common type is when a competitor uses a trademark to palm off
counterfeit goods or services, 213 thereby confusing consumers

trademarked product, but does not engage in commercial activities, is not a trademark
infringer); see also Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 3:12-CV-535, 2013
WL 2156318, at *12 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013).
208
What-A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. Whataburger, Inc. of Corpus Christi, Tex., 357 F.3d
441, 452 (4th Cir. 2004).
209
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773; Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks v. Jurado, 643 F.3d
1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011).
210
See Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *6; MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader, No. 00
Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).
211
See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2003); Fortres
Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *6.
212
See Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012);
Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *9; MasterCard, 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 3644, at
*10; Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 689 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
213
See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26 n.1 (palming off is when a producer misrepresents her
goods or services as someone else’s; reverse passing off is when the producer
misrepresents someone else’s goods or services as her own.)
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regarding their source. 214 This type of infringement requires proof
that consumers were actually confused. 215
A second type of infringement, pertinent here, is false
endorsement. 216 Under § 1125(a)(1), 217 a trademark owner can
bring an action for trademark infringement against:
[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services [ . . . ] uses in commerce any
[trademark] that—
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or
her goods, services, or commercial activities by
another person . . . . 218

214

See Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 960 (2d Cir. 1996);
Gameologist Grp. LLC v. Sci. Games Int’l, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 141, 152 (S.D.N.Y.
2011). Classic trademark infringement involves “forward” confusion. Forward
confusion occurs when a defendant attempts to capitalize on the trademark holder’s
established reputation and good will by suggesting that its product or service emanates
from the same source as, or is connected with, the trademark owner. See Johnny Blastoff,
Inc. v. L.A. Rams Football Co., 188 F.3d 427, 436 (7th Cir. 1999); Fortres Grand, 2013
WL 2156318, at *6, *10. Reverse confusion occurs when a more famous commercial
entity uses its size and market penetration to overpower or usurp the mark of the smaller,
less famous trademark holder. See Custom Vehicles, Inc. v. Forest River, Inc., 476 F.3d
481, 484 (7th Cir. 2007).
215
See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2005); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
216
False endorsement claims are less common. See Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d
1007, 1013, 1018–19 (3d Cir. 2008).
217
Section 1125(a)(1) applies to unregistered marks, but § 1114 applies to registered
marks:
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered trademark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the
registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2005).
218
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)) (2012); see also Dastar, 539 U.S. at 31 (explaining that
“goods” are tangible products sold in the marketplace).
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The touchstone of liability is whether the trademark is used in a
“deceptive and misleading” way likely to cause consumer
confusion about such association or endorsement. 219
False endorsement occurs when the defendant uses a trademark
in a way that is likely to confuse or deceive the average consumer
regarding a trademark owner’s affiliation, connection, or
association with the defendant’s goods or services. 220 This type of
infringement does not require proof that consumers were actually
confused, but only that they would likely be confused or deceived
as to such association. 221
Although this is a lower threshold than actual confusion, it is
nonetheless “a high bar.” 222 It demands more than simply
referencing the trademark. 223 Instead, the mark must be used in a
way that makes an affirmative statement of the trademark owner’s
sponsorship or endorsement. 224 In fact, in the context of false
endorsement, because using another’s trademark to extract
parasitic value is seldom deceptive, 225 it generally does not
constitute false endorsement. 226
219

See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 28; see also Crystal Entm’t & Filmworks v. Jurado, 643
F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011); Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 682,
689 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
220
See Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 960 (2d Cir. 1996);
Gameologist Grp. LLC v. Sci. Games Int’l, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 2d 141, 165 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
221
See Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1021 (3d Cir. 2008) (a party must show
only likelihood of confusion); see also Ray Commc’ns v. Clear Channel, 673 F.3d 294
(4th Cir. 2012); Am. Family Life Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp. at 690–91 (only subsection
(a)(1)(A) of 15 U.S.C. § 1125 includes the phrase “likely to cause confusion”).
222
Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 WL 2156318,
at *10 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013).
223
See id. at *16; see also MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader, No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *10–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“‘one anecdotal instance of
purported actual confusion is at best de minimis, indeed infinitesimal, and insufficient;’ a
survey revealing a less than 3% rate of confusion was insufficient to show a likelihood of
confusion.”) (quoting Brockmeyer v. Hearst Corp., 248, F. Supp.2d 281, 298 (S.D.N.Y.
2003)); Cumberland Packing Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 140 F. Supp.2d 241, 254 (E.D.N.Y.
2001) (a survey showing a 7.84% confusion rate found to be insufficient to raise a
material fact as to the likelihood of confusion).
224
See Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *26 (“[T]his [is] a high bar.”)
225
See Am. Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 691 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
226
Even where risk of confusion exists, some courts have concluded that such use that
otherwise would violate the Lanham Act is not actionable unless (1) the mark has no
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When a trademark is used in an advertisement for a product,
however, a consumer might reasonably presume some connection
or endorsement between the trademark and the product. 227
Consequently, such uses may constitute infringement. 228 For
example, the Ninth Circuit allowed Tom Waits to assert an
unregistered commercial trademark in his distinctive vocal
attributes. 229 After Waits refused Frito-Lay’s endorsement offer,
Frito-Lay used a sound-alike of him in an ad, and Waits sued
Fritos for infringement. 230 The court stated that because Waits’
trademark (his voice) was featured in a product ad, it was
reasonable that consumers would mistakenly think he was
endorsing that product. 231 Accordingly, he was permitted to
pursue his trademark infringement claim. 232
By contrast, mentioning or displaying a trademark in a noncommercial context does not present the same potential for
confusion, 233 so it typically does not constitute infringement. 234
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever or, (2) it has some artistic relevance,
but explicitly misleads as to the source or content of the work. See Univ. of Ala. Bd. of
Trs. v. New Life Art Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2012); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000,
Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008); Browne v. McCain,
611 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (noting artistic relevance test). Essentially,
if the use of a trademark is artistically relevant, then the use is either not infringing or will
not be confusing, and thus is not infringement.
227
See generally State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 343
F.3d 249, 257 (4th Cir. 2003) (trademarks serve as a primary instrument “in the
advertisement and sale of the seller’s goods”).
228
See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1106–07 (9th Cir. 1992); Arenas v.
Shed Media, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1181,1188 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
229
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1107.
230
Id. at 1106–07; see also Arenas, 881 F. Supp. at 1188.
231
Waits, 978 F.2d at 1093, 1110–11.
232
Id. at 1098, 1111; see also Abdul-Jabbar v. GMC, 85 F.3d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1996)
(false endorsement “based on the unauthorized use of a celebrity’s identity” is actionable
as trademark infringement).
233
See 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenY.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 2005);
Interactive Prods. Corp. v. a2z Mobile Office Solutions, Inc., 326 F.3d 687, 695 (6th Cir.
2003) (Lanham Act does not apply when using a trademark in a ‘non-trademark” way);
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, 971 F.2d 302, 307 (9th Cir. 1992)
(trademark infringement does not apply to a “non-trademark use of a mark”); Fortres
Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 WL 2156318, at *7 (N.D.
Ind. May 16, 2013); 4 ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 207, at § 22:25 (using the
trademarked product, does not constitute infringement). Courts typically assess
likelihood of confusion by weighing several factors, but these are largely inapt to false
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For example, a plotline of the movie The Dark Knight Rises
involves a computer program called “Clean Slate” that can erase
one’s criminal history from every computer database in the world,
thereby giving a person a clean slate. 235 In reality, the Fortres
Grand Corporation manufactures (and has trademarked in
connection with) a software program called “Clean Slate” which
protects the security of computer networks by erasing all evidence
of user activity. 236 Fortres Grand complained that by calling the
fictional computer software “Clean Slate,” Warner Brothers
(producers of The Dark Knight Rises) infringed on its
trademark. 237 The court rejected the claim. 238 It explained that the
film’s product was fictional, and “[t]here is no affirmative
statement here that would indicate that Fortres Grand sponsored or
endorsed the use of ‘clean slate’ in The Dark Knight Rises.” 239
Therefore, the use of the trademarked name could not infringe on
Fortres Grand’s trademark, and the public would not be misled. 240
Rogers v. Grimaldi is further instructive. 241
There, a
filmmaker made a movie “Ginger and Fred” about two fictional
Italian dancers named Ginger and Fred. 242 Ginger Rogers
complained that the movie’s title falsely implied that she was
endorsement claims of the sort addressed in this article. The Second Circuit weighs eight
factors first established in Polaroid: (1) strength of the mark; (2) degree of similarity
between the marks; (3) proximity of the products or services; (4) likelihood that the prior
owner will bridge the gap into the newcomer’s product or service line; (5) evidence of
actual confusion; (6) whether the defendant adopted the mark in good faith; (6) the
quality of defendants’ products or services; and (8) sophistication of the parties’
consumers. Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid Elecs., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). The
Ninth Circuit evaluates likelihood of confusion by considering: “(1) strength of the mark;
(2) proximity or relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of
actual confusion; (5) marketing channels; (6) type of goods and degree of purchaser care;
(7) intent in selecting mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion.” See Walter v. Mattel, Inc.,
210 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000).
234
See Univ. of Ala. Bd. Of Trs. v. New Life Art Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir.
2012); see also Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
235
Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *3.
236
Id. at 2.
237
Id. at 7.
238
Id. at 22.
239
Id. at 26.
240
Id. at 22.
241
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
242
Id. at 996–97.
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endorsing or featured in the film. 243 The court disagreed, and
concluded that any risk that the audience would be misled into
thinking Rogers was associated with or endorsed the film was
slight. 244
This remains true when the physical or aural quality of a
performer is integrated into a product or copyrighted work itself.
For instance, singer Debra Laws complained when a J-Lo/L.L
Cool J song sampled (pursuant to a copyright license) a portion of
a record she had recorded. Laws claimed that inasmuch as the new
recording included her voice, it infringed on her vocal
trademark. 245 In dismissing her claim, the court stated that since
her voice was not used in an ad or connected to a commercial
service, its use did not imply that she was endorsing a product. 246
In another case, a retired professional football player sued the
Madden NFL video game for including his likeness. 247 The court,
held that “without more, [this was] insufficient to make the use
explicitly misleading.” 248
VII. USE IN COMMERCE
Finally, to constitute infringement under Federal law, the
trademark must be used in commerce. Section 1125(a)(1) of the
Lanham Act imposes liability on “[a]ny person who, on or in
connection with any goods or services . . . uses in commerce any
[trademark].” 249 The definitional section of the statute states that:
243

Id. at 997.
Id. at 1000.
245
Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2006).
246
Id.; see also Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1160–61 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(where there was no vocal impersonation, so consumers would not have believed that
Henley had performed the campaign songs for or endorsed Devore.)
247
Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-01598-FMC-RZx, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
131387, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2009).
248
Id. at *13.
249
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003) (the Lanham Act’s reference to “goods” means
“merchandise” or tangible products sold in the marketplace). Section 114 provides that
Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant [] use in
commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered trademark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in
244
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For purposes of this chapter, a mark shall be
deemed to be in use in commerce . . . (2) on
services when it is used or displayed in the sale or
advertising of services and the services are rendered
in commerce, or the services are rendered in more
than one State or in the United States and a foreign
country and the person rendering the services is
engaged in commerce in connection with the
services. 250
In the typical infringement case, a defendant uses a trademark
to pass off its goods or services as being provided or sponsored by
the trademark owner. 251 Because these situations inevitably
involve commercial businesses, consumers in the marketplace, and
product packaging or advertising, their commerciality is beyond
cavil. Consequently, courts have had little occasion to look
beyond the presence of the trademark itself and analyze the
statute’s “commerce” language. 252
False endorsement cases of the political ilk, however, differ
significantly from the typical scenario. A campaign’s playing
music to fire up a crowd, as the candidate’s introduction theme, or
while awaiting her arrival has no obvious commercial connotation.
Arguably, music at public venues is so common that it imputes no
special meaning. Even if donations are solicited or a song is
included in a political advertisement to express a campaign
message, no product is sold, no commercial service is rendered (or
no service is rendered in commerce), and no business entity is
involved. Therefore, the public performance, derivative use, or
duplication of the copyrighted musical work might be implicated
(as in Butler and Henley), but there is no reason for commercial
enterprises or consumers making purchasing decisions to be
confused. Rather, the context is political. Consequently, political
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive [] shall be liable in a civil action by the
registrant for the remedies hereinafter provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2) (2005) (emphasis added).
250
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
251
See Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 WL
2156318, at *4 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013).
252
See Interspace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 1983).
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campaigns have argued that their uses of trademarks either are
altogether immune from the Lanham Act or, in practice, do not
meet its “commerce” requirement. 253
The meaning of the statute’s “commerce” language is,
therefore, critical when analyzing the viability of a false
endorsement claim, and even more so when considering potential
infringement by political campaigns. This language, however, has
been interpreted in different ways. 254
Depending on the
interpretation, a political campaign’s use may be wholly exempt
from a trademark infringement claim, fail to meet the prima facie
elements of infringement, or be infringing in only limited
situations. Further complicating the issue is that some types of
trademark infringement do not require a use in commerce. The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) (§1125(c)) exempts all
“noncommercial” uses of a mark. 255 Therefore, a trademark owner
claiming dilution 256 under the FTDA does not need to show that
the defendant used its mark in commerce. 257
A. The Unauthorized Use of the Trademark Must Occur in
Commerce
A number of courts read the “uses in commerce” language of §
1114(1)(a) and § 1125(a)(1)(A) (“any person who uses in
commerce any trademark . . . “) in conjunction with
§ 1127’s

253

See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp 2d 1125, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
See id. at 1131–32 (citing United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am.
N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997)).
255
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4) (2012) (“[T]he following shall not be actionable under this
section: . . . (B) Noncommercial use of a mark”); see also MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader,
No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
256
Dilution is “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of (1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.” 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). The law governing dilution is independent from the law of
trademark infringement. See Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 801 (6th Cir.
2004). “Dilution, unlike traditional trademark infringement law . . . is not based on a
likelihood of confusion standard, but exists only to protect the quasi-property rights a
holder has in maintaining the integrity and distinctiveness of his mark.” Id. (citing
Kellogg Co. v Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 628 (6th Cir. 2003).)
257
See Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003);
MasterCard, 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS 3644, at *18–20.
254
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definition of “use in commerce.” 258 Specifically, these courts
deem “use” and “in commerce” as separate elements of an
infringement claim. 259 Therefore, to establish a prima facie case of
infringement, the trademark owner must show that the defendant
“used” the mark in a particular way and must show that the use
was in commerce. 260 Consequently, only certain commercial uses
of a mark constitute infringement. 261
This is consistent with both the plain language of § 1127 262 and
its history. Section 1127 states that “use in commerce” means that
the trademark is either physically placed on goods or services that
the defendant sells or transports in commerce or is used in the sale
or advertising of services that are rendered in commerce. 263 If the
defendant’s use in commerce were unnecessary for infringement,
this statutory provision would be superfluous. Furthermore, as
originally enacted, § 43(a) gave trademark owners a remedy
against a person who used in commerce either “a false designation
258

15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); see also Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp 2d 1125, 1131
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing United We Stand America, Inc. v. United We Stand, America
New York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997)); MGM-Pathe Commns. Co. v. Pink
Panther Patrol, 774 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on
Social Networks: Trademark Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58
BUFFALO L. REV. 851, 874–75 (2010).
259
See, e.g., 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenY.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 492, 407 (2d Cir.
2005); Time v. Peterson Publ’g Co., 173 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 1999); Estee Lauder Inc.
v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1508–09 (2d Cir. 1997).; see also Ramsey, supra note
258, at 874–75
260
See 1-800- Contacts, 414 F.3d at 412; Time, 173 F.3d at 117; Estee Lauder Inc., 108
F.3d at 1508; Ramsey, supra note 258, at 874–75.
261
See Ramsey, supra note 258, at 874.
262
The Supreme Court employs a plain language approach when interpreting statutory
provisions. See, e.g., Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1264, 1266 (2011)
(using plain meaning to interpret the term “personnel rules and practices” in Exemption 2
of the Freedom of Information Act); CSX Transp. Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 131 S.
Ct. 1101, 1108 (defining “tax” and “discriminate” according to their plain meaning).
263
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1)(B) (2006) (“[A] mark shall be deemed to be in use in
commerce—(1) on goods when—(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their
containers or the displays associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or
if the nature of the goods makes such placement impracticable, then on documents
associated with the goods or their sale, and (B) the goods are sold or transported in
commerce, and (2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of
services and the services are rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more
than one State or in the United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the
services is engaged in commerce in connection with the services”).

2013]

I DO NOT ENDORSE THIS MESSAGE!

39

of origin, or any false description or representation” in connection
with “any goods or services.” 264 Hence, it is reasonable that
trademark infringement requires the defendant to use the trademark
in commerce.
B. A Trademark Must Be Used in Commerce to Earn Protection
A few commentators propose that “in commerce” pertains to
the validity of the trademark itself. 265 Under this view, since a
putative trademark owner must demonstrate “the bona fide use of a
mark in the ordinary course of trade” in order to protect a mark, §
1127 simply enumerates which acts suffice as “bona fide uses of a
mark in the ordinary course of trade.” 266 The infringing use,
however, need not occur in commerce. 267
This logic is questionable. That possession of a valid
trademark requires its use in commerce does not mean that the
allegedly infringing use need not be in commerce. In other words,
a trademark owner may need to prove, first, that it used the mark in
commerce in order to claim it as a protectable trademark, and then
that the defendant used the trademark in commerce for it to
constitute infringement.
Indeed, since the Lanham Act is
concerned with consumer confusion and unfair commercial
competition due to unauthorized uses of commercial trademarks,
and references “commerce” and “use in commerce” throughout, it
is reasonable that both trademark ownership and trademark
infringement contain commercial elements.
C. Use in Commerce Is a Jurisdictional Predicate
Other courts insist that the relevant language in §§ 1114(1)(a)
and 1125(a)(1)(A) is not the phrase “use in commerce,” but the
word “commerce.” 268 According to these courts, “in commerce”
simply invokes Congress’s authority under the Commerce
264

See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003) (citation
omitted).
265
See Ramsey, supra note 258, at 874 (citing commentary by Graeme B. Dinwoodie &
Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV.
1597, 1609–12 (2007)).
266
Id. at 874.
267
Id. at 874–75.
268
See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005).
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Clause, 269 thereby articulating the jurisdictional predicate for
federal regulation. 270 In this view, infringement does not require
that the defendant use the trademark in commerce, but only that the
defendant’s use affect interstate commerce, such as by diminishing
the trademark owner’s ability to control the use of its commercial
mark. 271
This position was adopted in a case involving the use of a
Jackson Browne song in a political ad. 272
During the 2008
Presidential election, the Ohio Republican Committee (on behalf
of the Republican Party and nominee John McCain) produced an
eighty-second advertisement 273 that criticized Barack Obama’s
energy policy amid rising gas prices, 274 and featured a recording of
Browne’s “Running on Empty.” 275 Browne, a self-described
liberal who supported Obama, 276 alleged that this infringed on both
his copyright (as the songwriter) and trademark (as the singer) by
falsely suggesting that he sponsored, endorsed, or was associated
with McCain “when nothing could be further from the truth.” 277
The Republican National Committee (RNC) moved to dismiss,
contending that the Lanham Act applied only to commercial

269

See United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86,
92–93 (2d Cir. 1997); Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2009);
Ramsey, supra note 258, at 873–74.
270
See Ramsey, supra note 258, at 874; see also United We Stand, 128 F.3d at 92–93
(“[U]se in commerce reflects Congress’s intent to legislate to the limits of its authority
under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the Lanham Act to profit-seeking uses of
a trademark.”).
271
See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1131–32; see also, e.g., Maier Brewing Co. v.
Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 120 (9th Cir. 1968); Planned Parenthood
Fed’n of Am., Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629 (KMW), 1997 WL 133313 at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997) (noting that the scope of “in commerce” is broad).
272
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1128.
273
The Committee broadcast the ad on television and posted it on YouTube. Id. at
1129.
274
Id. at 1128 (complaint dismissed).
275
Id. at 1128 (the commercial played “Running on Empty” in the background as it
criticized Obama’s suggestion that the country could conserve gasoline by keeping their
automobile tires inflated to the proper pressure.).
276
See Geoff Boucher, Jackson Browne Sues John McCain over Song Use, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2008, 12:40 PM,, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2008/08/jacksonbrowne.html (detailing Browne’s campaign contributions to Democrat candidates).
277
Browne, 611 F. Supp. at 1127, 1129; see also Boucher, supra note 276.
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speech so it could not apply to a political ad, 278 and that because
the ad was an “artistic work,” the First Amendment protected its
use of Browne’s song. 279
The court rejected the RNC’s argument that the Lanham Act
was limited to commercial speech, and that Browne could not, as a
matter of law, claim trademark infringement within a political
context. 280 It explained that the Act’s reference to use “in
commerce” simply articulated Congress’s regulatory authority
under the commerce clause. 281 Accordingly, Browne did not need
to prove that the RNC had used his trademark in commerce, but
only that the RNC’s use diminished his ability to control the use of
his mark in commerce. 282
The court also rejected the idea that the First Amendment
barred a trademark infringement claim against political speech. 283
It noted that other courts had applied the Lanham Act to political
speech, and added that widespread confusion and negative
consequences could result from political speech. 284
Despite Browne concerning a singer’s trademark infringement
claim against a political campaign, its precedential value to song
marks and false endorsement is limited. Aside from it being a trial
court, because the court was ruling on a motion to dismiss, it was
constrained to consider the facts in the light most favorable to
278

Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
Id. When a Lanham Act claim is based on use of a mark in an artistic work, thereby
implicating First Amendment interests, many courts analyze it under the Rogers artistic
relevance test. Under this test, an artistic work’s use of a trademark that otherwise would
violate the Lanham Act is not actionable unless the use of the mark has “no artistic
relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless
it explicitly misleads as to the source or content of the work.” Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
280
Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
281
Id. at 1131–32.
282
Id.
283
Id. at 1132–33. The RNC argued that its use of a song in a political campaign was
presumptively fair use. Id. at 1130. The court, however, refused to dismiss the copyright
claims, because the facts were not developed sufficiently to analyze the defense of fair
use, and because the RNC had not established that the use of a copyrighted work in a
political campaign was, as a matter of law, fair use. Id. at 1130–31.
284
Id. at 1132 (citing United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc.,
128 F.3d 86, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1997) (trademark infringement claim against a political
group) and MGM-Pathe Commc’ns. Co., 774 F. Supp. 869, 874–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
279

42

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:1

Browne, 285 namely, that Browne could establish ownership of a
trademark and that the use impeded Browne’s control of it.
Moreover, while the court held that a trademark owner is not
required to show that the infringer used the mark in commerce, it
did not address whether a song could be a trademark (or possessed
by a performer). 286 Consequently, that Browne defeated the
RNC’s motion to dismiss does not indicate that he had a
protectable trademark, let alone a winning trademark infringement
claim, but only that the RNC did not have a winning motion.
Furthermore, the case McCain cited to support its conclusion,
United We Stand America, 287 arose out of political campaigning
but reflected a typical infringement scenario. There, the disputed
trademark related to election and political advocacy services, as
did the allegedly infringing trademark, and the court’s analysis
suggested that only certain types of uses constitute infringement. 288
Back in 1992, 289 Ross Perot’s Presidential campaign committee
established the “United Corporation” and trademarked “United We
Stand America” as its service mark 290 (associated with its political
advocacy and campaign services). 291 It subsequently assigned to a
third party the rights to “United We Stand America.” 292 Later, an
individual who had worked with the Perot campaign began using
“United We Stand, America N.Y.” for his own political work. In
response, the trademark owner of “United We Stand America”
claimed infringement. 293 The issue was not whether disputes
pertaining to politics were beyond the reach of the Lanham Act,
but whether political services could fall within the scope of
“services” and “use in commerce.” The court held that the
defendant’s political activities under the mark constituted
285

Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, the court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draws
all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. See Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v.
Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004).
286
It appears that the RNC simply focused on the political character of the ad.
287
United We Stand Am., 128 F.3d at 92–93.
288
Id. at 92.
289
Id. at 88.
290
Id.
291
Id.
292
Id.
293
Id.
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“services” “in commerce” subject to the Lanham Act. 294 And
because the marks and services provided under them were very
similar, there was a likelihood of confusion. 295
Indeed,
MasterCard later noted that United We Stand was inapt to the use
of a trademark in a political ad. 296 Because a political ad invokes
no potentially competing commercial services, there cannot be
confusion about sourcing or sponsorship of those services by the
trademark owner.
VIII. CONFUSION DUE TO CAMPAIGN USES
Depending on a court’s interpretation of the Lanham Act’s
“commerce” language, a political campaign’s use of a trademark
may be exempt from a trademark infringement claim, fail to meet
the prima facie elements of infringement, or be infringing in only
limited situations.
Nevertheless, with regard to song mark infringement by
political campaigns, whether a mark must be used in commerce or
what the phrase means may be irrelevant. The Lanham Act is not a
catchall statutory provision that converts any type of confusion
into a legal cause of action. Instead, a trademark’s purpose is to
prevent consumer confusion about sources, services, and the
trademark owner’s sponsorship or approval of them, so only uses
likely to deceive consumers about those affiliations or related
commercial matters constitute infringement. 297 Accordingly,
regardless of whether the trademark owner needs to prove that the
294

Id. at 89–93; see also id. at 90 (finding that a group soliciting donations, issuing
press releases, holding press conferences, and organizing on behalf of its members’
interests is performing “services” within the meaning of the Lanham Act); Am. Family
Life Ins. Co. V. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 694–95 (N.D. Ohio 2002); N.A.A.C.P v.
N.A.A.C.P Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985) (indicating that Lanham Act remedies are “as available to
public service organizations as to merchants and manufacturers”).
295
United We Stand, 128 F.3d at 89–93.
296
MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader, No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS
3644, at *25 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
297
See Eastland Music Grp., LLC v. Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc., 707 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir.
2013) (quoting Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 31 (2003)); Ray
Commc’ns v. Clear Channel, 673 F.3d 294, 301 (4th Cir. 2012); Hormel Foods Corp. v.
Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 502 (2d Cir. 1996); Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner
Bros. Entm’t, No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013 WL 2156318 at *6 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013).
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alleged infringer (the candidate) used the song mark in commerce,
it must, nonetheless, demonstrate that the candidate’s use resulted
in the likely deception of consumers about commercial matters or
the trademark owner’s affiliation with or approval of the
politician’s commercial services or products. 298 Consequently, the
relevant question is whether a campaign’s use of a song would
confuse consumers into thinking that the singer sponsors or
endorses the commercial services of the politician. 299
A. Absence of Commercial or Consumer Confusion
First and fundamentally, since a politician is not engaged in
commerce, there is no commercial matter and no consumers
involved. As a result, even if the use of the song mark created
some type of confusion, it would not create consumer confusion
about a commercial matter. Therefore, it would not constitute
trademark infringement. 300
While voters compare political platforms and choose among
candidates, voters are not consumers in the marketplace and
candidates are not goods that they purchase. A politician has no
tangible goods or services to sell. In fact, it is illegal for a
politician to monetize the power to make political appointments,
monetary appropriations, and votes. 301 And, while preventing
confusion may aid in society’s political discourse, 302 trademarks
are not an election statute. 303
298

See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
See Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1379 (2d Cir.
1993) (the relevant question is whether the defendant’s use of the mark “is misleading in
the sense that it induces members of the public to believe [the work] was prepared or
otherwise authorized” by the plaintiff). See generally Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318.
300
See Rearden, LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1214 (9th Cir. 2012);
Fortres Grand, 2013 WL 2156318, at *6.
301
See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (prohibiting
candidates for office from announcing their “views on disputed legal or political issues”);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1976) (outlining legal and ethical restrictions of
politicians).
302
See Browne v. McCain, 611 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
303
A sponsor of the amendments to section 43(a), House Representative Kastenmeier,
stated that political advertising and promotion were not contemplated covered by the term
“commercial.” He explained that the statute uses the word “commercial” to describe
advertising or promotion for business purposes, whether conducted by for-profit or nonprofit organizations or individuals. Political advertising and promotion is political
299
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To illustrate, one of Ralph Nader’s presidential campaign ads
used MasterCard’s trademarked “Priceless” riffed off the popular
MasterCard ads. MasterCard complained that this infringed on
their trademark “Priceless” which designated its credit and
financial services. The court, however, held that Nader’s use of
trademark was not commercial, so it was permissible. 304 It
observed that MasterCard’s “Priceless” campaign was well-known
and more importantly, the credit and financial services that it
designated had no rational connection to Nader’s political
candidacy. As a result, the average consumer would not have been
misled into thinking that MasterCard was connected with the
campaign or endorsing Nader. 305
Using a song in a political advertisement does not alter this
conclusion. 306 The media format of a commercial is not equivalent
to a commercial use or commercial speech. Although the
boundary between commercial and non-commercial speech can be
unclear, the Supreme Court has clarified it is the content of the
message articulated and not its form (“commercial speech” as
opposed to a commercial advertisement) that controls. 307 The core
notion of commercial speech is that it does no more than propose a
commercial transaction. 308
A political ad may be in the form of a commercial or possess
“commercial-like” qualities, but it clearly does more than propose
a commercial transaction; it seeks to educate, convince, and gain
the support of voters. Indeed, courts and agencies that have
considered campaign advertisements and solicitation of donations
have concluded that they are not “commercial speech,” but
political speech. 309 With regard to music in political ads, if the
speech, and therefore not encompassed by the term “commercial.” 134 Cong. Rec.
H.1297 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1989) (statement of Wisconsin Rep. Kastenmeier).
304
MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Nader, No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 U.S Dist. LEXIS
3644, at *28–29 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
305
Id. at *8–9.
306
The use, however, would implicate the rights of the copyright holder of the work.
307
See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409 (2001).
308
See id. at 409; Fortres Grand Corp. v. Warner Bros. Entm’t., No. 3:12-cv-535, 2013
WL 2156318, at * 11 (N.D. Ind. May 16, 2013).
309
See Fed. Election Comm. v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431, 440 (2001) (spending for political ends and contributing to political candidates both
fall within the First Amendment’s protection of speech and political association”);

46

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 24:1

song itself expresses a discernible message relevant to the
campaign, it is substantively speech. 310 Even if the song has no
obvious message, but is used as a melody or musical bed, it would,
nonetheless, be in a political advertisement.
B. Reasonable Likelihood of Confusion
Second, aside from who might be confused, confusion due to
hearing a song is highly unlikely. After all, playing and listening
to music is what music is for. The public constantly hears music in
stores, at sporting events, on hold with customer service, and at the
dentist’s office. Yet, the public does not become bewildered nor
do they interpret hearing the music as a singer’s endorsement of
the respective commercial establishments, athletic teams, and
endodontic procedures. There is no reason that the public would
perceive music at a political event or in an ad any differently. 311 In
fact, playing an aural trademark is comparable to a gym
broadcasting a song over satellite radio or a runner wearing a tshirt emblazoned with a brand. Both are permissible, noncommercial uses, and neither causes the average person to think
that the brand is affirmatively sponsoring the athlete. 312
When music fans play a song, they realize that it does not mean
that the artist is personally endorsing them, but that they are
appreciating the song and/or artist. Hence, the relationship
between a candidate and music is that of a fan who likes a song,
not the other way around. In fact, research shows that today’s
voters are interested in candidates’ personalities and lives outside
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (political campaign contribution and expenditure
limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities); Am.
Family Life Ins. Co. v. Hagan, 266 F. Supp. 2d 682, 697 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (candidate’s
soliciting donations and voters visiting political website is not commercial speech, but
political).
310
By the same token, that words are uttered by a politician does not render them
“political speech.” Nonetheless, while a political purpose may not bar a trademark (or
copyright) infringement claim, once the facts are considered, the First Amendment or
political message might be an adequate defense against any infringement claim. See Am.
Family Life Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp at 701.
311
See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1636–37 (2006) (correlating case law pertaining to
communicative strength of a mark and whether a court finds use confusing).
312
See 1-800-Contacts, Inc. v. WhenY.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 407 (2d Cir. 2005).
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of the political arena. 313 A candidate’s taste in music is one clue
voters use to discern a candidate’s personality 314 and identify with
them. 315 As a result, in recent Presidential elections, candidates
have released their iPod playlists to give the public a better sense
of who they are. 316
It follows that when the public hears “American Girl” or
“Wavin’ Flag” at a campaign event, in an ad, or on a candidate
playlist, it understands it the same way, that the candidate either
likes the song or is using it to convey a message. This is how
viewers interpreted The Roots’ playing “Lyin’ Ass Bitch’ to
introduce Bachmann; viewers who recognized the song believed
that The Roots were communicating their opinion about
Bachmann, not that the original performer Fishbone was endorsing
Bachmann’s candidacy.
Additionally, the only indication of confusion is anecdotal
evidence from singers who complain that fans might think they
sold out or endorse the candidate. 317 While a musical artist’s
objection demonstrates that any implication of endorsement would
be false, unsubstantiated fear is not proof that music consumers
would think that a candidate’s musical choice indicates an artist’s
endorsement. 318
Furthermore, inasmuch as this inference
presumes that a singer has a right to permit or deny the use of a
song, any audience confusion reflects a common misapprehension
313

See Florian Haumer & Wolfgang Donsbach, The Rivalry of Nonverbal Cues on the
Perception of Politicians by Television Viewers, 53 J. BROADCAST. & ELECTRONIC MEDIA
262, 263–64 (2009); Jordan, supra note 8, at 102.
314
See Haumer & Donsbach, supra note 313, at 263–64; Jordan, supra note 8, at 102–
03.
315
See Jordan, supra note 8, at 103.
316
See id. at 102.
317
K’naan, for instance, said that he was flooded with Twitter messages accusing him
of selling out. See McKinley, supra note 2.
318
A possibility of confusion is lesser and not equivalent to a likelihood of confusion.
See A & H Sportswear v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, 166 F.3d 197, 206 (3d Cir. 1999). To
illustrate, Henley submitted survey evidence that audience members might believe that
Henley approved of the campaign’s use of the Plaintiffs’ songs. The court, however,
stated that this was not probative of whether people would reasonably think that Henley
performed the music in the videos. “To the extent that the [survey information] indicates
a likelihood that Henley’s endorsement was based purely on the use of his music, this is
not a cognizable injury.” Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d. 1144, 1169 (C.D. Cal.
2010).
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about copyright and music rights, not confusion about a
commercial matter. In any event, it might be infuriating when a
candidate whom the singer dislikes uses a song, but to the extent
that the audience is aware of a singer’s politics, it would realize
that the song is not an endorsement.
Indeed, it seems that the crux of these complaints is that the
artist disapproves of the candidate and does not want it to bask in
the glow of the artist, or wants to remain free of any connection.
Although a performer’s frustration might be understandable, it
does not engender a legal right. When creations such as music and
movies are made available to the public, all members of the public
may use and enjoy them. If a vocalist wants to ensure that people
she disapproves of cannot play songs she has performed, then she
must not make her performances and recordings available. Even
copyright authors do not possess such an ideological or protective
associational right. 319
IX. COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION
Independent of the legal theory of song mark protection is
whether a legal action to enforce of such a right is subject to
preemption. A song-trademark founded on the performance of a
musical work or sound recording implicates copyright. The
Copyright Act establishes a comprehensive statutory scheme
governing the existence and scope of protection for “original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.” 320 This includes musical compositions, lyrics, and
sound recordings. 321 As explained in Dastar, which involved an
unsuccessful trademark claim over an expired copyrighted work,
319

Alternatively, the musical artist might fear “guilt by association,” that if music
consumers or record companies’ dislike of the politician, they might not purchase the
artist’s records or services. This, however, does not fit into false endorsement, but
somewhat more akin to an insufficient tarnishment claim.
320
See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006). “A work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of
expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of
the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.” 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2010).
321
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2)(7) (2006).
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the rights of copyright are part of a “carefully crafted bargain,” 322
and courts must prevent trademark and related protections from
encroaching on areas traditionally occupied by copyright. 323
To maintain copyright’s dominion, 324 the Copyright Act
includes a broad preemption provision 325 found in section 301. It
provides that:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that [1] are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 (i.e.,
the right to reproduce, prepare derivative works,
distribute, publicly perform, or display) in [2] works
of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of
expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by §§ 102 and 103 . . . are
governed exclusively by this title. 326
Essentially, when some other right collides with copyright, §
301 determines the right of way. 327 Typically, if the asserted right
is equivalent to those of copyright, it must yield. 328 As applied to a
song, though a musical composition sometimes can be protected by
both trademark and copyright, preemption often precludes
concurrent, co-equal protection. 329

322

Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox, 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003).
See id.; TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
324
See Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992)
(section 301 ensures that the enforcement of these rights remains solely within the federal
domain).
325
This type of “ordinary preemption” is a substantive, affirmative defense that state
claims have been substantively displaced by federal law. Complete preemption is not a
defense, but a jurisdictional rule for assessing federal removal jurisdiction when a
complaint raises only state law claims. See Stuart Weitzman, LLC v. Microcomputer
Res., Inc., 542 F.3d 859, 864 (11th Cir. 2008).
326
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006).
327
Id.
328
Id.
329
See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 2011) (copyright protection
does not render songs “ineligible for protection as trademarks”).
323
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A. Scope of Preemption
To be preempted by § 301, the asserted right must be
equivalent to 330 a right contained in § 106. 331 Though preemption
is most obvious when a theory of legal recovery directly conflicts
with copyright, a cause of action need not be identical to a
copyright claim to be preempted. 332 If, notwithstanding its label,
the claim attempts “to prevent nothing more than the reproduction,
performance, distribution of a . . . performance captured [in a
tangible medium]” 333 or its underlying nature is part and parcel of
a copyright claim, it is an equivalent right preempted by § 301. 334
Importantly, § 301 does not state that the asserted right itself
involve a tangible copyrightable work enumerated in §§ 102 or
103. Instead, it asks whether the rights asserted are equivalent to
330

See Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1993)
(“[R]eference must be made to the elements of the state cause of action”).
331
Section 106 grants an author/owner five divisible rights to do or authorize the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease,
or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and
choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly;
and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).
332
See Motown Record Corp. v. George A. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236, 1239–40
(C.D. Cal. 1987).
333
Daboub v. Gibbons, 42 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1995) (claim preempted because the
core of theory of recovery was the wrongful copying, distribution, and performance of a
song’s lyrics); see also Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 653 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
334
See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134,1143–45 (9th Cir. 2006); Fleet, 58
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649–50 (performance captured in a tangible medium is subsumed by
copyright and preempted); cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d
195, 201 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (the alternative and
copyright claims both rest on the unauthorized publication).

2013]

I DO NOT ENDORSE THIS MESSAGE!

51

the kinds of exclusive rights articulated in § 106, 335 the section of
the Copyright Act that enumerates the rights granted in
copyrightable works (which, in turn, are listed in §§ 102 and 103).
Put another way, § 301 asks whether the right asserted is
comparable to any of the rights that a § 102 or 103 work would
possess, namely, those enumerated in § 106.
This requires identifying what rights a claim seeks to vindicate
and evaluating them against those of § 106. 336 If they are
comparable to those of § 106, such as when the plaintiff attempts
to control the reproduction, public performance, or distribution of a
copyrighted work or performance captured in a tangible work, the
claim is preempted. 337 If they are qualitatively different from
those of copyright (or that would be exercised by a copyright
holder), they are not. 338
Where the alternative cause of action is qualitatively different
than a copyright claim (and does not assert control over a
copyrighted work), it is not preempted. 339 Often, this is readily
apparent because the alternative cause of action contains different
elements than a copyright claim. Importantly, it is not the presence
of an additional element that rescues a claim from preemption, 340
but the impact of that element, namely that the extra element
transforms the nature of the claim. Consequently, while a claim
premised on a copyrighted work or component is preempted, a
misappropriation or publicity claim unrelated to a copyrighted
work, is different from a copyright claim and is not preempted. 341
335

See Foley v. Luster, 249 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2001).
See Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs.,Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1993)
(“[R]eference must be made to the elements of the state cause of action”).
337
See Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 650–51.
338
See Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 501 (7th Cir. 2011); Laws, 448 F.3d at
1143–45; Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 909–10 (7th Cir. 2005); Aronson v.
Dog Eat Dog Films, 738 F.Supp. 2d 1104, 1116 (W.D. Wash. 2010); Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 650–51 (performance captured in a tangible medium is subsumed by copyright law
and preempted).
339
See Laws, 448 F.3d at 1144–45; Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 649. 651.
340
See Laws, 448 F.3d at 1144 (“Although the elements of Laws’ state law claims may
not be identical to the elements in a copyright action, the underlying nature of Laws’ state
law claims is part and parcel of a copyright claim.”).
341
The House of Representatives Report on the amendments to the preemption
provisions stated that because misappropriation is not necessarily synonymous with
copyright infringement, a misappropriation claim might not be preempted, provided it is
336
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For instance, California’s privacy and publicity law sometimes
protects iconic musical artists from the commercial use of soundalike performers. 342 Provided that claim is not premised on and
does not exercise control over a copyrighted work, it is not
preempted. 343
Courts have formulated preemption analysis into various tests.
Some courts first examine the asserted claim “to determine
whether it falls ‘within the subject matter of copyrights defined by
17 U.S.C. § 102,” and then review the cause of action “to
determine if it protects rights that are ‘equivalent’ to any of the
exclusive rights of a federal copyright, as provided in 17 U.S.C. §
106.” 344 Other courts consider whether a claim meets both a
“general scope requirement,” 345 and a “subject matter
requirement.” 346 If it meets both, the claim is preempted. 347 To
the extent that this asks whether the claim involves a work that
falls within §§ 102 or 103, can be more demanding. This is
exemplified by the Seventh Circuit’s version: “First, the work in
which the right is asserted must be fixed in tangible form and come
within the subject matter of copyright as specified by § 102.
Second, the right must be equivalent to any of the rights specified
in § 106.” 348
This, however, either inartfully implies or
inaccurately assumes that the claim involves an underlying work
that itself is copyrightable or tangible and that such work is among
those identified in §§ 102 or 103.

not based on a right within the general scope of copyright as specified by 17 U.S.C. § 106
or on a right equivalent thereto. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.
342
See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 1992); Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
343
See, e.g., Facenda v. NFL Films, 542 F.3d 1007, 1029 (3d Cir. 2008); Waits, 978
F.2d at 1100; Midler, 849 F.2d at 460, 462.
344
Globeranger Corp. v. Software AG, 691 F.3d 702, 706 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Carson v. Dynegy, Inc., 344 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 2003).)
345
In other words, does it seek to vindicate legal or equitable rights equivalent to one of
the bundle of exclusive rights protected by § 106?
346
In other words, is the work in question of the type protected under 17 U.S.C. §§ 102
and 103?
347
See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848 (2d Cir. 1997).
348
Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 674 (7th
Cir. 1986) (emphasis added).
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To the extent that a preemption analysis demands some
tangible copyrightable corpus or suggests a claim that includes an
uncopyrightable element does not fall within §§ 102 or 103 and
thus escapes preemption, it misstates the statute. It may also open
the door for performers to raise (albeit, incorrectly) publicity and
misappropriation claims based on the theory that ephemeral
identity cannot be copyrighted or assert that where an alternative
claim includes a prima facie element distinct from a copyright
claim, it is not preempted.
B. Preemption of Uncopyrightable Qualities and Components of
Copyrighted Works
Performers asserting identity-based rights have argued that
because neither voice nor identity is copyrightable, claims based
on voice or identity are not preempted—either they do not fall
within §§ 102 and 103, and therefore are not within the subject
matter of copyright, or they do not possess the rights enumerated in
§ 106, so they cannot be preempted. 349 This logic is flawed and
consistently has been rejected by courts.
Preemption’s purpose is to deprive states the power to bestow
copyright-like protections on materials that Congress intended to
be uncopyrightable or in the public domain. 350 Therefore, it can
function properly only if the “subject matter of copyright” is
construed to include all works of a type covered by §§ 102 and
103, even if federal law does not protect them. 351 If it were
otherwise, states could expand copyright protection as far as they
wish, on the theory that the materials protected or rights granted by
the state did not meet federal copyright standards, so they were not
preempted. 352
349

See generally Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1992).
See Seng-Tiong Ho v. Taflove, 648 F.3d 489, 501 (7th Cir. 2011); Toney v. L’Oreal
USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539
(1985) (allowing states to expand copyright protection to works Congress deemed
uncopyrightable would defeat the Act’s central purpose).
351
See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 850 (2d Cir. 1997)
(quoting ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996)).
352
See R.W. Beck, Inc. v. E3 Consulting, LLC, 577 F.3d 1133, 1146–47 (10th Cir.
2009); NBA, 105 F.3d at 849.
350
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The assertion that since voice is not copyrightable, voicerelated claims are not within the scope of copyright ignores the
copyrightable work through which or in which the voice is
expressed, that is, works within §§ 102 and 103. Case law is clear
that inasmuch as they are part of a copyrighted work, the
uncopyrightable components comprising that work, 353 such as
facts, 354 ideas, 355 or performances, 356 come within “the broad
ambit of the subject matter categories” of § 102. 357 “[A] party
who does not hold the copyright in a performance captured on film
cannot prevent the one who does from exploiting it by resort to
state law.” 358
For example, while on a trip, Ken Aronson injured himself and
landed in the hospital. 359 His friend captured this on a video,
which he later allowed Michael Moore to use in his documentary
Sicko. 360 Though Aronson sued Moore for misappropriation as
well as copyright infringement, the court held both claims
preempted. 361 It explained that although Aronson’s “persona” was
not a work within § 102, the video capturing his persona was. 362
Since his claims arose out of the use and distribution of that
copyrighted video, it was equivalent to the assertion of a right
within copyright. 363 Similarly, professional baseball players who
appeared in games copyrighted to and broadcast by the MLB, sued
353

See R.W. Beck, 577 F.3d at 1146–47; NBA, 105 F.3d at 849 (“Copyrightable
material often contains uncopyrightable elements within it, but Section 301 preemption
bars state law . . . claims with respect to uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable
elements.”).
354
See Harper & Row, 723 F.2d at 200 (discussing President Ford’s memoirs
containing uncopyrightable facts).
355
See Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 306 (2d Cir. 2004)
(discussing the non-copyrightable elements of an entertainment project, like ideas, are not
sufficient to remove from preemption).
356
See generally Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2006); see also
Part III, infra.
357
Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 306.
358
Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 652–53.
359
See Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1108–09 (W.D. Wash.
2010).
360
Id. at 1108–09.
361
Id. at 1114, 1116.
362
Id. at 1116.
363
Id.
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MLB for using their images without their consent. 364 Because the
claim rested on their identities captured in a copyrighted work, the
court held that the claim was preempted. 365
In another case involving an appearance in a film, CBS
purchased the exclusive rights to distribute and broadcast a
copyrighted movie. 366 When the producers of the film failed to
pay the actors’ salaries, the actors sued CBS for the unauthorized
use of their likenesses and violation of their rights of publicity. 367
Again, the court recognized that the actors were attempting to
control the distribution, display, and performance of a copyrighted
movie. 368 Once those performances were incorporated into the
film, they were “‘dramatic works’ ‘fixed in [a] tangible medium of
expression’” and within the scope or subject matter of copyright. 369
Consequently, the claims were preempted. 370 Similarly, the NBA
complained that Motorola was reporting the scores and facts of
basketball games broadcast by the NBA. 371 Unable to bring a
copyright infringement action, 372 the NBA framed its claim as
tortious behavior. 373 This, too, was unsuccessful. The court
concluded that because the NBA’s complaint was about the
reproduction, distribution, and display of the facts within the
copyrighted broadcasts, it was within the scope of copyright, and
preempted. 374
Identity and misappropriation claims by musical artists based
on the use of records have also been held to be preempted. For
364

See Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 674–
79 (7th Cir. 1986).
365
Id. (inasmuch as athletes’ images were broadcast as part of copyrighted games,
players’ right of publicity claims were preempted by copyright).
366
See Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
367
Id. at 646–47.
368
Id. at 651. Unable to collect from the movie’s producers, the actors sued CBS for
violating their right of publicity. Id. at 646–47.
369
Id. at 650.
370
Id. at 652–53.
371
See Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848–49 (2d Cir. 1997).
372
Id. at 848–49 (“Although game broadcasts are copyrightable while the underlying
games are not, the Copyright Act should not be read to distinguish between the two when
analyzing the preemption of a misappropriation claim based on copying or taking from
the copyrightable work.”).
373
Id. at 848.
374
Id. at 848–49.
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example, recording artist Debra Laws recorded “Very Special”
under a contract with Elektra /Asylum Records. 375 That contract
gave Elektra the exclusive rights to the master recordings,
including the rights to “lease, license, convey or otherwise use or
dispose of such master recordings,” and permit others to use Law’s
name and likeness in connection with the recordings. 376 Years
later, Elektra licensed the recording to Sony Music to sample in the
Jennifer Lopez / L.L. Cool J song “All I Have.” 377 Elektra credited
Laws but did not obtain her permission. 378 In response, Laws sued
Sony not for copyright infringement, but for misappropriation of
her name and voice sampled in “All I Have.” 379 Laws argued that
since she was not challenging the use of the copyrighted sound
recording, but rather the use of her name and voice in the sound
recording, her claims were substantively different from and outside
of the subject matter of Copyright law. 380
Recognizing that the crux of Laws’ complaint was about the
use of the copyrighted sound recording, the court rejected her
restyled copyright plea. It explained that the crux of Laws’
complaint was about the use of the copyrighted sound recording. 381
The copyright owner had the exclusive right to permit
reproduction, derivative use, or performance of the copyrighted
work, and had properly licensed the work to Sony. 382 Hence, the
subject matter of her claims fell within the subject matter of the
Copyright Act. 383 With regard to Laws’ assertion that her
misappropriation claim required proof of the extra element of
“commercial purpose” (which copyright infringement did not) and
protected different rights than copyright, the court explained that
the additional element did not change the underlying nature of the
action. 384 Consequently, her claims were preempted. 385
375

See Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134,1135–36 (9th Cir. 2006).
See id. at 1136.
377
See id.
378
Id. (the credits of the sound recording read, “Featuring samples from the Debra
Laws recording ‘Very Special.’”).
379
Id. (discussing misappropriation of identity for commercial purposes).
380
Id. at 1138, 1144.
381
Id. at 1144.
382
Id. at 1144–45.
383
Id. at 1136–38, 1144.
384
Id. at 1144–45.
376
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Digable Planets’ trademark infringement and misappropriation 386 complaints regarding Target’s use of “Rebirth of Slick”
fared no better. 387 Digable Planets argued that because its
complaint was not about the use of the copyrighted song, but about
the unauthorized use of their uncopyrightable voices, its claims
were not preempted. 388 The court, however, explained that
Digable Planets was not claiming that Target’s ads used
impersonations of them, but that the ads used their copyrighted
sound recording and composition. 389 Because the claims arose out
of Target’s use of the copyrighted works, 390 the claims were within
the subject matter of copyright, 391 and preempted. 392 Butler and
Laws underscore that the mere presence of an additional element in
or alternative label for the alternative claim will not rescue it from
preemption. 393 Rather, that extra element must transform the
nature of the cause of action into something qualitatively different
than a copyright claim. 394
X. WHAT RIGHTS DOES A SONG MARK SEEK TO VINDICATE?
Fundamentally, a song mark asserts a right to control and
prohibit the use, adaptation, and public performance of a musical
composition and/or the sound recording that includes the vocals.
These are not merely equivalent to rights within the purview of
copyright, they are precisely the rights granted by Copyright law.
A song mark is not solely voice or persona expressed via aural
frequency, but is founded on a copyrighted composition or a sound
recording, both of which are works within §§ 102 and 103. This is
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further apparent when recognizing the perverse impact a song
mark would have on the rights of a copyright holder. Because a
performer could wield a song mark to prohibit uses of works by the
copyright owners, a song mark would extinguish the rights of a
copyright holder. In fact, the performer would have a right
superior to them. 395 It is therefore clear that such a claim and
attempt to control identity through song mark is preempted.
Additionally, while ephemeral voice may not be copyrightable,
a recording of a voice performing a musical composition or fixed
in a sound recording is. When identity is evidenced through the
performance of or captured in a copyrighted work, it is subsumed
by the copyrighted work. As a result, it becomes part of a
copyright claim. Because the copyrighted work as a whole
satisfies the subject matter requirement, it is preempted. 396 Indeed,
while the statute does not protect voice as a copyrighted work, it
does contemplate voice as a mechanism by which to exercise the
rights granted by copyright. Consequently, voice may not be
tangible, but as an instrument to perform or exercise a right under
copyright, it is within the purview of Copyright law. There is a
difference between a claim that falls outside of the subject matter
of copyright and a claim that does not meet the prima facie
requirements of a copyright action. That a performer would not be
able to bring a copyright infringement action does not mean the
performer’s claims are not within the purview of copyright and
rescued from preemption. Instead, it means that the singer would
not prevail in a copyright lawsuit. Nonetheless, § 301 does not
create a cognizable right in anything that is not protected by
copyright, but ensures copyright’s preeminence of scope.
CONCLUSION
The complex intersections of trademark and copyright,
exacerbated by the interests of performers in managing their
artistic personas and politicians in connecting with voters, have
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cultivated an environment where these rights involved are
commonly misconstrued and the stakes are high. With the 2016
election season already upon us, these disputes will only continue
to arise until the issue is addressed.
Although it is understandable that a performer would not want
a politician she opposes to use what she considers to be “her” song,
this type of personal objection is not equivalent to a protectable
legal interest. Performers do not possess proprietary rights in the
works they perform, and cannot leverage participation into rights
superior to those of the copyright owners of such works.
Moreover, restyling this as a trademark claim cannot alter its
fundamental nature—any attempt to control the use of vocal
identity in a musical work necessarily attempts to control the
underlying copyrighted work. Thus, any issue or right falls within
the purview of (and is preempted by) the Copyright Act. Indeed,
several courts have observed that performance-based rights of this
ilk would conflict with copyright and wreak havoc on longestablished understandings of trademark and commercial practices.
While economic inconvenience does not extinguish a legitimate
right, here it reveals the inherent conflict between song marks and
Copyright law. Nevertheless, § 1125 (a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act
does not prohibit any unauthorized use of a trademark, but only
ones likely to deceive consumers about commercial matters.
Because a politician is not a commercial enterprise providing a
tangible product or service, its use of a song mark, even if
misleading, could not reasonably result in consumer confusion
about a commercial matter. Consequently, it does not amount to
trademark infringement.

